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ÖZET 
Bu tez Basel Komitesinin Basel I ve Basel II uzlaşılarında görülen 
eksiklikleri gidermek için Basel III Uzlaşısı adı altında getirdiği yeni 
düzenlemelere, uygulanmış olan uzlaşıların Türkiye ve bütün dünyada 
yarattığı pozitif ve negatif etkilere ve henüz uygulanmamış olan Basel III 
Uzlaşısının olası etkilerine değinmek amacıyla hazırlanmıştır. Bu amaçla 
akademik araştırma yapılarak Basel I, Basel II, Basel 2.5 ve Basel III 
uzlaşılarının temel kuralları ve hedefleri ayrıntılı bir biçimde incelenmiştir. 
Daha sonra Basel uzlaşılarının Türkiye’deki etkilerine yer verilmiştir. Buna 
ek olarak diğer ülke bankalarıyla yapılan karşılaştırmalarla Türk bankacılık 
sisteminin genel görünümüne değinilmiştir. Tartışma metodu kullanılarak 
2008 finansal krizi ve Basel II Uzlaşısı arasındaki bağlantıya, kredi 
derecelendirme kuruluşlarına dair eleştirilere, kredi temerrüt swaplarının 
önemine ve Basel III Uzlaşısına dair çeşitli öngörülere yer verilerek çalışma 
sonlandırılmıştır. Sonuç olarak Basel Komitesi tarafından yapılan 
düzenlemelerin, yüksek sermaye yeterliliğine sahip Türk bankacılık 
sektöründe herhangi bir soruna yol açmayacağı, aksine Basel uzlaşılarının 
Türkiye’deki finansal istikrara ve risk yönetimine önemli katkıları olacağı 
kanısına varılmıştır. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the study is to address Basel III Accord which 
contains new regulations done by the Basel Committee to overcome the 
shortcomings of Basel I and Basel II, the positive and negative effects of the 
regulations applied in Turkey and all over the world and the possible effects 
of Basel III Accord which has not been applied yet. With this aim, while 
doing an academic research fundamentals and goals of Basel I, Basel II, 
Basel 2.5 and Basel III accords are analyzed in detail. After that, it is 
mentioned the effects of Basel accords in Turkey. Moreover, Turkish 
banking system’s general overview is placed while comparing with the 
other countries’ banks. By using discussion method and giving place to the 
relation between the 2008 financial crisis and Basel II Accord, the criticisms 
about the credit rating agencies, the importance of credit default swaps and 
various predictions about Basel III Accord, the study is finalized. As a 
conclusion, regulations which are made by the Basel Committee will not 
cause any problems thanks to the Turkish banking sector’s high capital 
adequacy structure and Basel accords will have significant contributions to 
the financial stability and risk management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial system of a country consists of insurers, pension funds, 
securities markets, central banks and supervisory authorities. The duty of 
these markets and corporations is to realize economic transactions and 
provide monetary policies to ensure economic growth. A problematic 
financial system may cause big financial crises while a well-regulated 
financial system provides financial and economic stability.   
Banks are the most important tools of the finance sector because of 
their financing power of the reel sector in necessary conditions. Since banks 
are the most important players in the financial sector, resource allocation 
becomes more crucial. Gathering all kind of capital; such as houshold 
savings, corporate investments and channelizing them to the correct 
directions is a big challenge. Banks draw a road for the capital formation 
with its financial instruments. People or companies decide to invest their 
money according to the information they have been given. Also achieving 
that in different and various financial systems requires being more 
responsive and up-to-date. Right after technology's fast development and 
international economic structure has become more connected, modern 
banking system became widespread, and the globalization in banking sector 
has begun.  With these developments, Bank for International Settlements 
was founded in 1930 in Switzerland with the aim of coordinating banks 
which operate in the international market and to facilitate the money 
transfers between central banks.  The central banks of 55 countries, 
including Turkey, are the members of BIS. 
Due to the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime in the 
70’s and the oil crisis in 1974, “The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision” was founded by BIS in 1974 to find a common solution to the 
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international foreign exchange and banking problems. This committee is 
created by the chiefs of G-10 countries’ (Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, 
England, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Holland, 
Spain, USA) central banks or supervisory authorities.  The principal duties 
of the committee are the development of the techniques which are used 
under the supervision of banks, the provision of the sharing information 
about subjects such as the control or regulations of banks and the 
determination of the capital adequacy standards. 
The bankruptcy of major banks beginning from the 80’s was an 
evidence of the inadequacy of traditional risk measurement methods and 
therefore banks began to search new ways for the risk control. As a result, 
international regulators developed several principles about effective 
supervision of banks to reduce and control risk in the financial market.  In 
1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision announced the first 
advisory Basel Accord which was not enforcement but a recommendation 
for the countries.  Subsequently, in 2004, because of the inadequacy of 
Basel I in the operational banking crisis BIS published Basel II Accord.  
Basel Committee has continued to develop Basel Accord to strengthen the 
financial structure of banks and to prevent financial crisis. In July 2009, 
some changes were made to improve Basel II Accord and these changes are 
called as Basel 2.5 Accord. Moreover, in September 2010, Basel II Accord 
was improved in detail after the global financial crisis and Basel Committee 
began referring to this new regulatory framework as Basel III Accord.  
The increase in foreign capital inflows in Turkey is an indicator for 
the fast development of the Turkish banking sector. Due to the 
developments in international financial markets, it becomes an obligation to 
make some arrangements in various fields in Turkey, such as the 
supervision and control of banks as in other developing countries. 
3 
 
The aim of this study is to point out the regulations of Basel Accords 
and its effects on the Turkish banking sector and other countries and 
examine the predictions about Basel III Accord which is not implemented 
yet. This study consists of five main sections.  
Firstly, Basel I, Basel II, Basel 2.5 and Basel III accords and the 
differences between them are analyzed in detail. Moreover, positive and 
negative views about these accords are taken place.  
Secondly, the implementation process of Basel I Accord by Turkey 
and the possible effects of Basel II, Basel 2.5 and Basel III accords on the 
Turkish banking sector are explained. Also, the problems encountered by 
Turkey in the preparation process of Basel II are examined. 
Subsequently, general view of the Turkish banking sector before the 
global financial crisis and after that is investigated while comparing Turkey 
with other countries. 
Finally, the last part of the study includes the reasons of the revisions 
made by the Basel Committee, the deficiencies of Basel I and Basel II 
accords, the relation between the global financial crisis and Basel accords, 
the post financial crisis situation in the world and the predictions related to 
the implementation of Basel III Accord. 
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2. BASEL ACCORDS 
2.1 Basel I Accord and its Basic Principles 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision established by the 
attendance of Central Banks of developed countries and  authorized persons 
from the auditing corporations, published the Capital Adequacy Framework 
in 1988, known as Basel I, in order to create a sector standard and  
harmonize capital adequacy calculation methods applied in different 
countries. This framework was accepted by the supervisory authorities of 
many countries, including G-10 countries.  
Basel I Accord includes four pillars that are constituents of capital, 
risk weighting, a target standard ratio and, transitional and implementing 
agreements.   
The first pillar, known as the Constituents of Capital, divides the 
capital reserves which are used for the calculation of capital adequacy ratio 
into two tiers.  The Tier 1 Capital which is the main measure of a bank’s 
financial strength consists of core capital but it also consists of retained 
earnings and non-redeemable preferred stock.  Banks must hold %4 of Tier 
1 capital of which a minimum core capital ratio is %2.  On the other hand, 
the Tier 2 Capital also called supplementary capital which is %4 includes 
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions, hybrid debt 
capital instruments and subordinated term debt. The Tier 1 capital is %4 of 
risk weighted assets.  The Tier 2 Capital should not exceed %100 of the Tier 
1 Capital which means that effectively at least 50% of a bank’s capital base 
should consist of Tier 1 capital. 
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The definition of the capital adequacy, which is known as Cook 
Ratio, was first argued in Basel Capital Accord, published in 1988. 
According to this ratio; 
		
		
	 =
				
	 + 					

	
			
>= % 
The nature of the crisis that has occurred in Turkey and Mexico in 
1994 showed the importance of adding some elements that carries out 
market risk like foreign exchange, interest rates and commodity prices to 
capital adequacy calculation.  In addition, with the effects of the unstable 
interest rates and exchange rates, many financial corporations were 
bankrupted in the USA.  From 1996 onwards, the market risk which 
contains the risks based on interest rates and exchange rates was appended 
to the denominator of the CAR in the USA. Because of these reasons, Basel 
I is regulated to include the market risk while determining the capital 
adequacy and by this way the developing process of Basel I accelerated.  
		
		
	 =
				
	 + 					

	
			 + 	
			
>= % 
The proposal also liberalized the definition of capital by adding a 
third tier. Tier 3 capital comprised short-term subordinated debt, but it could 
only be used for the market risk. Tier 3 capital is used to support market 
risks. 
The second pillar of Basel I Accord, Risk Weighting, determines 
different risk weights for the banks’ assets.  For instance, a customer given 
credit and his capital requirement, in terms of the credit risk situation, is 
determined whether the country is an OECD country or not. It means that 
the OECD countries are in an advantageous position for the credit facilities.  
It is suggested in Basel I that in the process of giving credits, banks should 
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apply specific principles and the risk amount which the banks undertake 
should be at an acceptable level.  There are five risk categories in the Basel I 
Accord.  The first category weights assets such as cash held by a bank, 
central banks’ and government’ debts in domestic currency and all OECD 
debts at 0% and these are seen as riskless.  The second risk category is 20% 
which weights assets like development bank debts, OECD bank debts, 
OECD public sector debts and non- OECD bank debts which are under 1 
year maturity.  The third risk category which is 50% includes only 
residential mortgages.  The fourth risk category which is 100% weights 
assets which have high risk such as private sector debts, non-OECD bank 
debts with a maturity over a year, equity assets held by a bank and all other 
assets.  The fifth category weights the public sector debts at 0%, 10%, 20% 
or 50% and this is related to the central banks’ decision. 
The third pillar, Target Standard Ratio, determines international 
capital adequacy standards.   According to these standards, the minimum 
capital adequacy ratio should be 8%.  The minimum capital adequacy ratio 
which is 8% which cover risk-weighted assets should be the sum of Tier 1 
Capital (4%) and Tier 2 Capital (4%).  By this way a bank makes provisions 
for the predictable loss and regulates the liquid capital for unpredictable 
loss. 
The fourth pillar, Transitional and Implementing Agreements, aims 
to spread the implementation of Basel I Accord.  The supervision of the 
domestic authorities is very important for the implementation of the accord 
and each central bank should create enforcement mechanisms.  
According to the Basel I Accord, banks should use the standardized 
method and also with the allowance of the formal supervisory, they may use 
their own methods in order to measure the market risk.  The purpose of 
Basel Committee is to bring the same criteria to the international banks 
which have different control structures and to create the necessary 
environment for easier alignment in globalized competition. 
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2.1.1 Positive and Negative Views about Basel I 
 
Basel I is exposed to negative criticism by the major international 
players and academic circles of developed countries since it has a simple 
content.  However, as Yayla and Kaya (2005) states that the simple structure 
of Basel I and its feasibility facilitated its internalization by the developing 
countries.  Moreover, Basel I increased the competition in financial industry 
and modernized the regulations of the developing countries. It also created a 
fair competition atmosphere for the players of the market.  On the other 
hand, the capital adequacy ratio of 8% became an obligation in some 
developing countries and by this way financial stability has gained strength. 
Çelik and Kızıl (2008) present another point of view in this matter. 
They denote that Basel I is more favorable than Basel II for the OECD 
countries like Turkey because by the implementation of Basel II, the capital 
necessities will increase in the banking sector.  Basel II developed the 
internal ratings based approach to allow the banks to use their own risk 
rating system while they calculate the capital adequacy ratio. When the 
standardized approach is applied by the Turkish banks, all companies would 
be subjected to 100% risk weighting. However, the foreign banks which 
apply the internal ratings based approach to the unworthy companies will 
use lower risk weights and these banks will be in a more advantageous 
position than the banks which use standardized method. 
Despite the positive views about Basel I, there are also some 
negative views. The credit risk which the bank is exposed to in Basel I is 
calculated by separating different risk classes the bank’s off- balance sheet 
items and by multiplying the risk weights of each classes with the 
coefficients of 0%, 10%, 20% and 100%.  According to Yayla and Kaya 
(2005), Basel I in which there are only five different risk weight categories, 
has low risk sensitivity because it is a capital regulation applied to all banks 
in the same way.  Risk classification is arranged in a wide range so assets 
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which carry different risks are shown in the same risk group. This issue 
caused investors to make their risk analysis wrong.  Also, risk sensitivity of 
Basel I is low because it does not include operational risks.  In addition, in 
Basel I, risk weight which is given to the OECD countries is 0% because of 
the OECD club rule. In contrast, 100% risk weight is applied to the non-
OECD countries and it is considered as another weakness of Basel I.  The 
weaknesses of this implementation is understood by the crisis occurred in 
OECD countries.  
Moreover, Ayan (2007) claims that there is not a borrower 
differentiation in Basel I.  This differentiation is important while calculating 
the capital requirement based to the credit risk.  As an example, there are 
two companies and one of the companies has strong financial structure 
whereas the other has not. In this case, while granting a loan to them, the 
bank has to keep the same capital without looking to the morality of the 
companies.  Also, Basel I regulations could not predict secondary market 
changes.  For example, a lot of banks showed lower risk than they carry by 
positioning in derivative markets or selling their debts by securitization and 
by this way they continued their activities with low capital.  The banks 
which proceed to very risky investments in proportion to their capital caused 
to the rise of big crisis. 
Finally, the methods, which are suggested by Basel I Accord and 
which measure the credit and market risk of banks, remained inadequate to 
calculate banking risks in a realistic way, to take the financial market price 
fluctuations into consideration and to oversee different behaviors of banks 
while they are creating a portfolio.  Because of these reasons, it became a 
necessity to expand the coverage of the Basel I Accord and to configure it 
with more accurate risk measurement and management methods.  Indeed, 
the Basel I Accord adopted in 1988 gave place to the Basel II Accord in 
2004. 
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2.2 Basel II Accord 
2.2.1 Transition to Basel II and Differences between Basel I and 
Basel II 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s main purpose is to give 
more importance to the risk management and encourage the banks to 
continue risk measurement innovations by Basel II Accord.  In June 2004, 
Basel Committee published Basel II which means leaving the “one size fits 
all” method of Basel I used to calculate capital adequacy.  New convention 
aims to empower risk management methods, create more reliable 
infrastructure for the supervision of banks and to provide a sustainable 
financial stability in the global world. 
The club rule of Basel I which provides some advantages to the 
OECD countries is removed from Basel II.  In Basel II, the credit risk is 
determined according to the credit ratings of the borrower.  While some 
methods of Basel II Accord use the credit grades which are given by the 
independent auditing firms (Standard&Poors, Fitch, Moody’s, etc), other 
advanced methods take into consideration the credit ratings which are 
determined by the banks with the allowance of supervisory authority. 
In Basel I, there was an obligation of capital adequacy for credit and 
market risks. In addition to this obligation, the capital adequacy for 
operational risk was added to Basel II. According to Basel II, banks are 
responsible for the measurement and management of the material risks as it 
was the case in Basel I.  However, the identification and measurement of 
these risks are not an evidence for the adequate capital, right risk 
management or financial stability.  In addition to the risk measurement and 
management methods, the investigation of the supervisory authorities and 
the components of the market discipline are the important elements of Basel 
II.  The main purpose of Basel II is to suggest the banks to make provision 
for the expected risks and provide the minimum capital for the unexpected 
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risks.  In Basel II, banks are asked to evaluate their capital adequacy and the 
capital adequacy and evaluation process of the bank is needed to be audited 
by a supervisory banking authority.  The detailed information about capital 
adequacies has to be disclosed by the banks. There was not a regulation like 
this in Basel I.  
To summarize, Basel II aims to reach more stable, safe, and 
competitive finance sector by measuring the risks more sensitively, 
determining the risk profile of the banks separately, increasing the 
responsibilities of the banks’ senior management and disclosing the 
financial tables for reflecting the real situation of the banks and minimizing 
the asymmetric information between the players of the finance sector. 
2.2.2 Basel II and its Basic Principles 
 
In 1999, Basel Committee presented a formal debating atmosphere 
via internet with the aim of resolving the shortcomings of Basel I and 
creating new capital standards for banks.  The committee published the 
Basel II Accord in 26 June 2004 by using the suggestions offered in this 
debating atmosphere.   
Although Basel Committee has no legal authority, it is an 
organization composed of the public institutions of the related countries. 
The principles which are developed by the committee are not compulsory 
but advisory and they are accepted all around the world. The advises of 
Basel Committee were taken into account in the regulatory studies made by 
European Parliament and Council. 
Basel II aims to reach more competitive, healthy and stable financial 
structure while minimizing the asymmetric information among the players 
in the financial system by; 
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• Measuring  the risks more sensitive, 
• Defining the risk profiles of the banks one by one, 
• Increasing the responsibilities of the banks’ executives, 
• Explaining the banks’ financial situation with more clear financial 
tables. 
In the proposal published by the Basel Committee (2001), there are 
two basic aims and expectations. One of them was reaching more 
agreements in terms of regulatory and economic capital. Economic capital is 
the capital which meets the economic cost of the risks. On the other hand, 
regulatory capital is the capital advised by the Basel Accord.   The other aim 
is the provision of capital equipment which is predicted for the users of 
standardized approaches and which is kept approximately in the same level. 
The most important phase for developing countries is the 
implementation process of the accord.  There are alternative ways for the 
operation of Basel II. The first alternative way is related to the non-use of 
the new accord and development of the risk oriented management models. 
The other alternative is the USA model. In the USA model only 
international banks apply the new accord. The last alternative way is the EU 
model. EU banking system adopts the Basel II principles completely in all 
member countries.   
The Basel Committee predicts to apply the accord on international 
scaled banks in a consolidated basis. In Basel II, the investments which are 
described as affiliates are the investments made to the banks, securities and 
other financial institutions by the minority shareholders and which are not 
used in the organizational management. By decreasing legal investments 
and paid capital of these affiliates, it becomes possible to remove them from 
the banks’ capital. As an accord requirement, banks which are shareholders 
on the capital of an insurance company should undertake the whole risk of 
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this insurance company.  The investments made by the insurance companies 
were also removed from the related bank’s capital.  
We can collect the basic premises of Basel II Accord in three pillars. 
These are; maintenance of regulatory capital for credit risk, operational risk 
and market risk, reviewing of the banks’ risk management strategies by the 
supervisory authorities and disclosure requirements which will give 
information to the market participants about an institution’s capital 
adequacy.  
The first pillar is about the minimum capital requirement that a bank 
should keep against possible risks.  There are three different options which 
were predicted for credit and operational risk calculations by the approval of 
the supervisory authorities.    
In the credit risk calculations; 
• Standardized Approach 
• Foundation Internal Ratings Based Approach 
• Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach 
In the operational risk calculations;  
• Basic Indicator Approach 
• Standardized Approach and  
• Internal Measurement Approach can be used.  
The most remarkable innovation of Basel II is the addition of the 
operational risk next to the denominator of the capital adequacy ratio. 
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Basel Committee (2004) states that the supervisory authorities 
should notice that authorizing different approaches while calculating the 
bank’s capital adequacy may cause to the different capital adequacies for the 
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same type of operations.  To prevent this conflict, each supervisory 
authority should define a strategy which is suitable for their special 
conditions and their visions.  To summarize, the authorities should evaluate 
the conditions written below while taking into account the potential 
differentiations occurred from the use of multiple approaches about the 
capital requirements.  
• While determining the structure of the banking system, it is important 
to take into account the diversity of the operating banks.  For example, 
a country which has only domestic banking system is quite different 
from a country which has only foreign bank branches and subsidiaries. 
• The supervisory authorities should consider the possible effects of the 
new capital adequacy plan on the new products and services 
developed in their financial markets.  
The second pillar is related to the examination of banks’ risk 
management strategies by the supervisory authorities.  The supervisory 
authorities should pay greater attention to the quality of risk management 
system of the banks and their ability to evaluate exposed risks. Moreover, 
the auditing system should include meetings with the senior management 
and board of directors of a bank about the important issues such as on-site 
survey, remote surveillance and periodic reporting. Supervisory authorities 
should use their sources to create prudential standards and rules for applying 
Basel II principles. For example, in the standardized approach, supervisors 
should evaluate that 35% risk weight is enough for the real estate loans or 
not by taking into account the historical losses of their countries and if 35% 
risk weight is not enough, they should determine the prudential criteria that 
should be applied. Moreover, banks may need to change their internal 
systems in order to collect suitable data and meet the changing reporting 
requirements. Banks should have information technologies process and data 
storages in order to collect and save the data and calculate the loss 
efficiently. 
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Supervisors should discuss with the banks the process of upgrading 
to the next approach.   The dialog among the supervisory authorities is very 
important while sharing the practical resolving methods about the internal 
risk management processes and the difficulties in terms of compliance of 
Basel II. This kind of information sharing leads to comparison between 
Basel II implementations of different countries. 
  After making some assessments, some supervisors will permit to the 
use of Basel I or the basic principles of Basel II.  On the other hand, the 
others may want from their banks to change their system completely from 
Basel I to Basel II. Basel Committee (2004) indicates that the authorities 
should consider the factors written below while choosing the banks which 
are suitable for Basel II. 
• Banks’ growth (the share of their assets in the banking system) 
• Quality and complexity degree of the banks’ operations 
• Important fields of activities and business lines (Clearance and 
equalization operations, Have a large retail network) 
• International activities (cross border branch structure) 
• Relations with the international markets 
• Risk profile of the bank and risk management skills 
The main purpose of market discipline which is the third pillar of 
Basel II, is accomplishing the first and second pillars. In this context, Basel 
Committee aims to promote market discipline by creating several public 
announcement obligations for the banks.  These announcement obligations 
contain capital adequacy, risk exposures and risk assessment processes. By 
this way, investors will have an opinion about the banks’ risk level and 
methods to manage these risks.   
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With the provision of market discipline, it is aimed to reach correct 
and significant information by the investors and other related parties while 
determining their financial decisions. The aim is decreasing the 
uncertainties and risks in the market. On the other hand, the provision of 
market discipline contributes to the provision of financial stability.  
Moreover, market discipline encourages banks to act prudently by 
increasing the transparency level of information while making public 
announcements. In this context, Basel Committee believes that investors and 
other related participants will be able to make more detailed information 
about the banks’ capital level and they also will be able to make risk and 
quality assessments about the bank. In this pillar, the public announcements 
which are made by the banks should be consistent with the banks’ senior 
management and board of directors’ evaluation and management style of the 
banks’ risks. For example in the first pillar, banks use specific methods to 
measure the risks that they faced and determine the minimum capital 
requirement due to these risks. These methods are realized by using 
complex approaches.  According to Üçgün (2010), because of the error 
probability of these complex processes, the public announcement 
requirement fostered the banks to be more attentive and prudent while 
calculating the minimum capital requirement. 
2.2.2.1 Pillar I: Minimum Capital Requirements 
 
Pillar I is a part about the minimum capital requirement that a bank 
should keep against possible risks. In Pillar I, 8% minimum capital 
requirement ratio which is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital ratio remain 
same as Basel I. At this stage, operational risk is added to the accord.  The 
most important innovation in the “Standardized Approach” part of Basel II 
is using the credit notes of companies, banks and countries, given by the 
independent rating agencies such as “Standart&Poors”, “Moody’s and 
Fitch”, while determining the risk weights. On the other hand, in the 
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simplified standardized approach, defining the risk weights depends on the 
ratings given by the export credit agencies.    
The calculation methods in the different risk categories can be seen 
in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Calculation Methods for Different Risk Categories 
          Development Level 
of Measurement  
Method                    
Basic Medium Advanced 
Risk Category 
Credit Risk 
Simplified 
Standardized 
Approach/ 
Standardized 
Approach 
Basic Internal 
Ratings Based 
Approach 
Advanced        
Internal Ratings 
Based Approach 
Market Risk   Standardized Approach 
Internal Approach 
(RMD) 
Operational Risk Basic Indicator Approach 
Standardized 
Approach 
Advanced  
Measurement 
Approach 
Source: Arslan, İ.  2006, Basel Kriterleri ve Türk Bankacılık Sektörüne Etkileri, p.54 
Credit risk can be calculated by the standardized approach, basic 
internal ratings based approach and advanced internal ratings based 
approach. In order to calculate the risk weighted assets by the medium and 
advanced methods, the banks’ rating and risk forecast systems should have a 
rational and quantitative structure. In order to concretize this statement; 
• A bank should use a rating system as defined in Basel II minimum 
three years before starting the calculation.  
• A bank should use a 5 year data set in order to calculate probability 
of default. 
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•  A bank should use and calculate the parameters of loss given default 
and exposure at default according to the standards of the accord for 
minimum 3 years (for only advanced approach).  
While calculating the market risk, there is no important change in 
Basel II and the “value added risk” approach is the same as in Basel I. 
Capital requirement for the market risk may be calculated by the 
standardized approach. On the other hand, the measurement of the market 
risk can be done by the internal approach with the exception of foreign bank 
branches.  
In the operational risk measurement methods, suggested in Basel II, 
the basic indicator approach, standardized approach and advanced 
measurement approach are used by the banks. The midpoint of these 
methods is that calculation is made via the level of banks’ income.  
As a new innovation of Basel II, using the national preferred option 
and different options in some subjects has been left to the countries’ 
authorities’ control.  Moreover, in Basel II, choosing the ratings among the 
rating companies is also related to the choice of countries’ authorities. In 
this context, national authorities may apply less risk weight to the domestic 
currency risks. As Arslan (2006) states, because of the existence of the 
national preferred option, Basel II has a more flexible structure than Basel I. 
2.2.2.1.1 Credit Risk 
2.2.2.1.1.1 Standardized Approach and Simplified 
Standardized Approach 
 
 Credit risk is related to the loss occurred from the unpaid or late paid 
short and medium term loans. Participation banks, small scaled banks and 
medium-scaled banks use standardized approach or simplified standardized 
approach while calculating their capital adequacy for the credit risk. 
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Simplified Standardized Approach is mainly same with the “Standardized 
Approach”. Simplified Standardized Approach has been separated from the 
Standardized Approach in terms of taking into account the export credit 
rating agencies about the ratings. The main differences are that the 
simplified standardized approach permits to the banks to use only the first 
option, weights the corporate loans by 100% and not evaluate the credit 
derivatives in the context of credit risk mitigation techniques.   On the other 
hand, big scaled banks and medium foreign banks use the internal ratings 
based approach.  
 In the standardized approach which is the basic method of 
calculating the credit risk, the ratings given by the authorized institutions are 
effective in the determination of risk weights. Within the scope of the 
Standardized Approach, the holdings of the banks have been classified as 
portfolios written in Table 2.2 and each portfolio has different 
implementations.  
Table 2.2 Risk Weights Used in the Standardized Approach 
Assets Options AAA/AA- A+ / A- BBB+ /BBB- 
BB+ 
/B- 
Under 
B- 
Non-
Degreed 
Loans Given To 
Treasury/Central 
Banks 
According to 
the grades of 
ECAI 
0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Loans Given To 
Other Public 
Institutions and 
Organizations  
Treasury Kind 0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Option – 1 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100% 
Option – 2 20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 20% 
Loans Given To 
The Banks 
Option – 1 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100% 
Option – 2 20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 50% 
Option – 2 
(Short Term) 20% 20% 20% 50% 150% 20% 
Assets AAA/AA- A+ / A- BBB+ /BB- 
Under 
BB- Non-Degree 
Loans Given To The 
Corporations 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Assets Risk Weights 
Retail Loans 75% 
Mortgages 35% 
Non- Performing Loans %50, %100 or %150 
Source: Yayla, M. & Kaya Türker, Y. 2005, Basel II, Ekonomik Yansımaları ve Geçiş Süreci, p. 7 
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a) Loans Given to the Treasury and Central Banks 
While financing the public debts, the rating of a country in the world 
market become an important factor.  In this context, if a country’s 
international rating is high, the risk weight of this country will be 0% while 
financing public or collateralizing treasury bonds. On the other hand, if the 
ratings are insufficient more guaranties will be needed.    
b) Loans Given to Other Public Institutions and Organizations 
The methods which are applicable in the receivables from banks are 
also valid for the receivables from the governmental foundations. However, 
according to the choice of the national supervisory authority, the risk weight 
which is used in the treasury and central bank might be used for some 
governmental foundations which own the criteria determined in Basel II. 
c) Loans Given to the Banks 
Basel Committee predicted two alternative methods for the loans 
given to the banks. One of them will be applied by the decision of the 
national supervisory authority.   
In the first method; the risk weight of the banks is determined 
according to the rating of the bank’s country. Banks are subjected to one 
point less than the countries’ ratings. 
The second method uses the banks’ own credit grades and 
determines the risk weight while taking into account the debt maturity.  In 
short term receivables which have less than three months maturity, one 
grade less than the bank’s grade will be used but the risk weight should be 
limited with 20% minimum risk weight base.   
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Table 2.3 Risk Weights for the Loans Given to the Banks 
Degree 
AAA A+ BBB+ BB+ 
Below B- Non degreed 
AA- A- BBB- B- 
1. Method 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100% 
2. Method 20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 50% 
2. Method 
20% 20% 20% 50% 150% 20% 
Short Term* 
Source: Arslan, İ. 2006, Basel Kriterleri ve Türk Bankacılık Sektörüne Etkileri, p. 57 
 
In Basel II, the credit risk mitigation techniques are used to mitigate 
the credit risk occurred from the non – balance sheet activities and the assets 
of a bank.  CRM techniques are classified as the guaranties, on balance 
sheet clearance agreements and credit derivatives.  The minimum capital 
requirements may decrease by these techniques.  
d) Loans Given to the Capital Market Foundations 
The loans given to the capital market foundations will be evaluated 
as the loans given to the banks if they have got the regulations which 
correlate their equities and risks like the banks.  If they have not got such 
legislation, their loans will be evaluated as the corporate credits. 
e) Loans Given to the Corporations 
The financial companies which are not regulated or supervised as 
banks and insurance companies are categorized in this group. These loans 
are weighted by taking into account the grades of the independent rating 
agencies. If there is not a credit rate of the borrower, the risk weight should 
be 100%. However, this is a disadvantage for Turkey because most of the 
companies do not have a grade given by an independent rating agency. 
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The national banking supervision authorities were given the right to 
give 100% risk weight for all loans without looking the ratings given by the 
national independent rating agencies for the corporate loans. According to 
Basel II, corporate firms defined as corporations which have more than 50 
millions EUR endorsement.  
Table 2.4 Risk Weights for the Loans Given to the Corporations 
Rating AAA/ AA- A+/ A- BBB+/BBB- Under BB- Not Rated 
Risk 
Weight 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Source: Arslan, İ. 2006, Basel Kriterleri ve Türk Bankacılık Sektörüne Etkileri, p. 58 
 
f) Retail Loans 
The loans given to the SMEs which do not exceed 1 million Euros 
and each kind of private loans except mortgage loans are evaluated in this 
category and the risk weight is 75%.  
g) Mortgage Loans  
The residential mortgage loans risks’ are weighted at 35%. In Basel 
I, residential mortgage loans were placed in the 50 percent basket.  Because 
of this reason, there will be a decrease in the capital requirements for the 
mortgage receivables and other loans which are secured by the real estate of 
a barrower.  
h) Commercial Real Estate Loans 
In several countries, the commercial real estate secured loans are in 
the troubled asset type. As a result of this, the risk weight of these types of 
loans is 100% according to Basel Committee. However in some countries 
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where the real estate market is developed and well organized, the risk 
weight of these kinds of credits may be 50%. 
i) Other Assets 
Other assets are subject to 100 % risk weight. For example, the non-
financial investments and subsidiaries that will not decrease from the 
capital will be subject to 100% risk weight.  
j) High Risk Categories 
This category involves the corporate companies whose credit notes 
are less than BB- and countries and banks whose credit notes are less than 
B-.  In addition, this category weighted at 150%. 
2.2.2.1.1.2 Internal Ratings Based Approach 
 
The internal ratings based approach allows banks to use their own 
rating models. By this way, banks will be able to calculate default 
probabilities and it increases the banks’ maneuverability.  However the 
regulatory authorities should approve the banks’ internal rating methods. In 
order to use this approach, the bank must proof to the regulatory authorities 
that the rating and risk prediction methods give effective results. 
According to the internal ratings based approach, a bank should 
classify the receivables in order to evaluate the credit risks. In the context of 
this approach, the receivables are;  
• Corporate Receivables 
• Receivables from the Treasury and Central Bank 
• Receivables from banks 
• Receivables from the retail market 
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• Stock Receivables 
The regulation presents two approaches. 
• Basic Internal Ratings Based Approach 
• Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach 
In these two approaches, the main necessity is the rating system. A 
bank should carry the minimum requirements determined in Basel II to use 
internal ratings based approach.  The minimum requirements of the 
regulation include a series of standards such as the structure of the rating 
system, public announcements, etc... In the basic approach, the bank will 
determine the default probability in the repayment of the loans and the 
supervisory authority will supply other components. In the advanced 
internal ratings based approach, the bank which has a developed capital 
allocation structure is given the permission for supplying the other 
components.  As Evcil (n.d.) indicates criterias related to the banks’ use of 
the internal ratings based approach are as follows: 
• Significant, well defined and differentiated credit risk 
• Full and accurate rating determination 
• Auditing the rating system and process 
• Determining the criteria for grading system in detail. 
• Presenting a method for the estimation of default probabilities. 
• Acquiring a data processing system which has the capacity to 
provide the necessary data.  
• System approval by the local banking authority  
• Making public announcements determined in the third pillar of 
Basel II.  
The regulatory authority should deeply investigate the parameter 
predictions of the banks. In addition, the prediction of parameters affects 
also the accuracy of the capital requirements because wrong parameter 
predictions will create different minimum capital requirement values within 
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the banks and it will affect the market competition structure.   As a result of 
this, the reputation of the regulatory authority may be damaged. In this 
context, the safe structure of a data set which is used in the prediction of 
parameters is very important. On the other hand, the accuracy of the 
borrowers’ information creates neutral PD prediction statistics which is 
necessary for the calculation of the credit risk.  
Another important part of the internal ratings based approach is the 
consistency. This approach should be applied to all risky assets and all 
business areas. Nevertheless, in Basel II, if a bank cannot use the internal 
ratings based approach for all its asset classes in the same time because of 
the data restrictions; it is suitable to apply IRB approach step by step with 
the approval of regulatory authority.  
2.2.2.1.2 Operational Risk 
 
Operational risk is defined as the possible loss risk occurred from the 
inadequate or inoperative internal processes, systems or external factors. In 
the context of operational risk, the legal risk is included; however the 
strategy and reputation risks were excluded from the approach. As Basel 
Committe (2004) states, in the process of transition to Basel II, the 
supervisory authorities should be aware of the effects of the obligation to 
hold capital for the operational risks. Moreover they should encourage the 
banks to develop appropriate approaches for the measurement of operational 
risks. 
While calculating the operational risk, it is possible to use the basic 
indicator approach, the standardized approach and advanced measurement 
approaches. Each approach involves applications which have high risk 
sensitivity than the previous one.  
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Basel II aims to keep less capital on banks which have more 
comprehensive risk management applications for the operational risks. 
However this condition does not work in general because a more 
comprehensive approach may calculate higher capital requirements than a 
simple approach.  If a bank has an approval for a comprehensive approach, 
it is prohibited to return to a more simple approach. 
In banks, the transactions which cause to the operational losses are 
subject to the analysis periodically. On the other hand, some precautions 
were developed to prevent these losses for the business areas where the 
operational risk is high. In banks, operational risk departments were created. 
In addition some banks created early warning systems about the operational 
risk conditions. In order to quantify the operational risks, some banks 
created risk maps.  
Basel Committee (2001) supposed that 20% of the capital will be 
adequate for the operational risk. However, after the inquiries and surveys, 
this 20% target is decreased to 12%. 
Basel II suggests three different approaches to determine the 
operational risk. These are basic indicator approach, standardized approach 
and advanced measurement approach. 
2.2.2.1.2.1 Basic Indicator Approach  
 
In the basic indicator approach, the last three years average gross 
income amount is considered as an indicator of the risk and capital 
requirement for the operational risk is calculated by multiplying this amount 
with the defined coefficient (15% Alfa factor).  
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2.2.2.1.2.2 Standardized Approach 
 
In the standardized approach, the banking facilities are separated into 
8 activities. These are: 
• Corporate Financial Services 
• Exchange Services 
• Retail Banking 
• Corporate Banking 
Payment and Clearance Services 
• Agency Services 
• Asset Management  
• Retail Brokerage Services 
The capital requirement is calculated by multiplying the last three 
years average gross income amount of each branch with the defined 
coefficients for each branch (12%, 15% or 18% Beta factors).  The average 
of capital requirements’ of these branches gives us the amount of capital 
requirement that a bank should keep against the operational risks. The main 
difference between standardized approach and basic indicator approach is 
the use of different coefficients for each branch in the standardized 
approach. 
2.2.2.1.2.3 Advanced Measurement Approaches 
 
In Basel II Accord, banks were authorized to establish their own 
models if they meet the required criteria. In addition, a bank which satisfies 
the conditions can use advanced measurement approach for its some 
operations and use basic indicator approach or standardized approach for 
other operations by the approval of supervisory authority.  There are three 
methods determined for the “Advanced Measurement Approach”.  These 
are: 
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a) Internal Measurement Approach 
It is more complex than the basic indicator approach and 
standardized approach, however this approach is more sensitive to risk.  The 
calculation of the capital requirement for the operational risk is based on the 
bank’s internal loss data. By this way banks are encouraged to collect 
internal loss data. 
b) Scorecard Approach 
In the scorecard approach, the capital for the operational risk which 
is reserved for the whole bank or its operational branches will be determined 
and this capital will change according to the scorecards in the length of 
time.  Through the scorecards, a risk profile and risk control framework is 
defined for the various branches. In the scorecard approach, the risks of the 
related branches are evaluated and converted to capital by the manager(s) of 
the branch. However, the weakest point of this approach is that the 
scorecards which are filled by the branch managers may be relatively 
subjective. In order to reduce this weakness, historical loss amount should 
be used while verifying the scorecard approach results.  
c) Loss Distribution Approach 
Loss distribution approach based on the collected data predicts the 
probability and possible damages of loss which occurs from the operational 
risks of each branch. As in the market risk, the loss is calculated by the 
value at risk model. 
However as Giese claims (2002) these methods are in the monopoly 
of big banks because of high technical costs. Most of the banks calculate the 
capital requirement for the operational risks on the banks’ income which is 
an unsafe way.  
28 
 
2.2.2.1.3 Market Risk 
 
Market risk is the probability of loss occurred on the balance-sheet 
and of balance-sheet positions which depends on the price changes.  As 
another definition, market risk is the possible losses arising from the 
changes in the risk factors.  These risk factors are interest rate risk, 
exchange rate risk, stock price risk, commodity price risk, option risk. 
In Basel II there is not a significant change in the assessment of 
market risk and the Value At Risk approach and standardized approach were 
preserved as in the Basel I.  Except the foreign branches, the market risk can 
be measured with the internal model too.  The VAR results are used while 
allocating economic capital and setting and monitoring risk limits.  On the 
other hand, VAR model considered as an important element of the risk 
control and management processes.  In some small scaled banks, VAR 
models are only used for certain portfolio and positions.   
In the banks, some studies were carried out in order to make 
measurements by the sophisticated software and integrate these 
measurements to the data processing infrastructure. The banks which use 
internal models conduct the retroactive tests like the stress tests, scenario 
and sensitivity analysis for the reliability of the models.  
According to the Basel I Accord, while calculating the market risk, 
the risk weight of public securities was 0%. However, in Basel II Accord, 
there are different risk weights that change according to the ratings given by 
the ECA or ECAI to the country which exports the security. 
The Basel Committee has changed the Value at Risk Model, which 
has been applying since 1996.  The capital adequacy calculation for the 
stressed VAR and credit risk were added to the calculation of capital 
adequacy for the market risk.  The main reasons of this change are the losses 
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in the banks’ exchange accounts and increasing leverage effect along the 
time period of 2008 financial crisis. 
The committee presented two approaches in order to calculate the 
market risks:  Standardized Approach and Internal Measurement Approach.   
2.2.2.1.3.1 Standardized Approach 
 
Banks which do not use internal models in the market risk 
measurement and which do not have reliable risk measurement models are 
enforced to use the standardized approach for the measurement of the 
market risk. The implementation of this approach is undertaken by five 
headings like the exchange rate, interest rate, stock, commodities and option 
risks. Interest rate and stock risks have two components as the general 
market risk and special risk. Capital requirement calculations are performed 
for each of these risk components.  
2.2.2.1.3.2 Internal Measurement (Value at Risk) 
Approach 
 
As a result of the developments in the information technologies, 
diversification of financial instruments and increase of transactions, the 
kinds and sizes of the risks faced in the markets were also increased.  In 
addition, the financial institutions which have to maintain their functions in 
extremely fragile conditions need the advanced risk measurement models in 
order to measure their risks in a correct and a comprehensive way. This 
necessity increased after the crisis occurred because of the insufficiency of 
risk management processes.   
VAR Model is a risk measurement method which determines the 
possible loss in the value of portfolio. Internal measurement models are 
used for measuring the banks’ risks and calculating the minimum capital 
30 
 
requirements against these risks. In addition, because of the internal 
measurement models the comparison of banks becomes more reliable.   
The use of internal models is subject to the permission of the 
national supervisory authority.  The process of calculating VAR model 
consisted of 5 levels. These are: 
• Appreciation of the portfolios with the market price, 
• Measuring the variability of risk factors, 
• Determining the duration of owning, 
• Determining confidence interval, 
• Using the data to obtain the highest amount of loss and reporting 
results. 
However, the VAR amount is not seen sufficient for the provision of 
capital adequacy by the Basel Committee.  The highest value which is 
obtained, by weighting with the multiplication factor determined by the 
supervisory authority, the calculated VAR amount of the previous day and 
VAR amount realized in the last 60 days, is the value that a bank should 
keep as a capital for the market risk. 
2.2.2.2 Pillar II: Supervisory Review Process 
 
The Pillar II is the investigation process of banks’ risk management 
methods by the supervisory authority. Basel Committee re-defined the 
surveillance procedures on a wider plane with Basel II. It is aimed to 
empower the internal control and corporate management principles by the 
duties entrusted to the board of directors and managers.  The main purpose 
of the Basel Committee while innovating the surveillance procedures is 
maintaining the capital requirements and promoting banks to create and use 
efficient methods to monitor and manage their risks. It is very important for 
a bank the full compliance of Pillar II to perform a risk assessment which is 
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suitable with the first pillar’s complexity and nature. The Basel Committee 
defined four main principles to provide the compliance of Pillar I and Pillar 
II.  
2.2.2.2.1 First Principle of Pillar II 
 
 Banks should have internal systems for evaluating the capital 
adequacy and strategies to protect this capital adequacy against their risks. 
Banks should be able to announce the consistence of the target capital with 
the risk level they are facing to and current economic conditions.  Economic 
conditions or change of the banks’ facility areas creates important effects on 
the banks’ need of capital.  The banks should have a system which allows 
identifying, measuring and reporting the risks in a systematic and objective 
way. According to this principle, there should be a revision process made by 
the board of directors and managers, the evaluation of the capital 
requirements should be made correctly, the risk management should be 
made in a comprehensive way, internal control system should be revised 
and reporting should be made with the observation.  
The risk types which are not taken into account in Pillar I should be 
addressed in Pillar II. These risk types are credit concentration, structural 
interest rate risk, liquidity risk, business risk, strategic risk and reputation 
risk. The factors which are independent from the bank such as economic 
fluctuations should be in Pillar II. While evaluating the capital adequacy, the 
committee is aware that it is important to use a methodology which depends 
on banks’ scale, complexity of their interactions and their facility strategy. 
The big scaled banks which use advanced methods can pass to the economic 
capital methods.  Smaller banks which have not got complex activities can 
prefer judgment oriented models for the capital planning. These kinds of 
banks should have to show that their internal capital targets are compatible 
with their risk profiles.  
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2.2.2.2.2 Second Principle of Pillar II 
 
 Audit and supervisory authorities should examine the evaluation 
system and strategy of the banks about capital adequacy and should take the 
necessary precautions when the banks’ internal system is not enough.  
The supervisory authorities should control banks’ internal systems 
by examining the adequacy of target capital level with the loaded risks and 
existing external conditions, the review of the adequacy of target capital 
level by the bank management and the consistency of the content of the 
capital with the size and executed activities of the bank. 
Thus, the evaluation of the supervisory authorities is predicted as; 
on-site examination, off site examination and review, arranging meetings 
with the bank management, taking into account the independent audit 
reports about the banks’ capital adequacy and requesting periodical reports.  
The supervisory authority should provide that the banks’ analysis 
include all of the important risks. Moreover, there should be a process 
which assesses the bank’s risk management and control systems adequacy, 
the awareness of the board of directors on capital evaluation process and the 
use of capital adequacy evaluation while taking a decision. Also, the 
supervisory authority should also take into account that a bank considers the 
unforeseen events or not while determining their capital adequacy.  
2.2.2.2.3 Third Principle of Pillar II 
 
Local authorities should wait from the bank to operate above the 
minimum capital adequacy and if needed, the authority should request from 
the bank to keep a capital over the minimum capital.  
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The minimum capital standard defined in the regulation is a limit to 
evaluate a bank which has low credit worthiness as a bank which has normal 
credit worthiness. The banks’ activities type and size can change in the 
course of time so their risk structure and capital adequacy ratios can also 
change.  In the period of negative market conditions, increasing the capital 
may be costly for the banks that affected from the changes negatively.  In 
addition, banks may be faced of the risks occurred from the private or 
general economic conditions which were not specified in the first pillar.  
For example the supervisory authorities, 
• Should request only one ratio which is over %8 for all banks, 
• Should define trigger rates on a sectored basis which allows to apply 
increasing regulative measures  day by day, 
• Should define bank based target rates by taking into account the 
banks’ risk profile and risk management quality, 
• Should evaluate the acceptance of the banks’ ratio defining process. 
 
2.2.2.2.4 Fourth Principle of Pillar II 
 
 Local authorities should hinder the falling of the capital from the 
determined level (8%) and request from the banks about taking quick 
measures in order to increase the capital adequacy ratio over 8%. In order to 
increase the banks’ capital, the supervisory authority may audit the banks 
deeply, may limit the dividend distribution and may request from the bank 
to immediately increase its capital. 
As a result of these four principles written above, “economic capital” 
concept which has been using by the international banks for a couple of 
years is officially placed in Basel II. The economic capital represents the 
capital amount which is allocated as a buffer against the potential losses 
arising from the activities of the bank. The level of the regulatory capital is 
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determined by the regulatory authority and by this way it is aimed to protect 
the deposit holders and the financial system. However, the economic capital 
is occurred as a result of the risk consolidation and it is an approach which 
expresses different types of risks in a single metric. A bank may provide the 
minimum capital adequacy but it does not mean that it has enough economic 
capital.  Therefore, the bank should properly build the link between its 
capital and total risks and also the regulatory authority should approve it. 
It is emphasized that the banks and some of the corporate 
management units which started to work in the context of Pillar II were 
making progresses. According to the Pillar II, the five main components of 
the internal capital adequacy evaluation processes which are directly related 
to the banks are: 
• The board of directors’ and senior management’s oversight and 
control, 
• Solid and reliable assessment of the capital, 
• A comprehensive risk assessment, 
• Monitoring and Reporting, 
• Checking by the internal control system. 
In this context, the main studies done by the banks are: 
a) Process Determining 
In the banks, some processes about risk definitions, periodical 
revision of the risks according to the changeable market conditions and 
changes in banks’ positions and about the periodical reporting of the need of 
regulatory and economic capital to the top management are determined.    
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b) Evaluation of the Capital Adequacy 
In the banks some studies are carried out about the evaluation 
processes of the capital adequacy in a regular basis. These studies include 
preparing qualified risk reports, applying stress tests and scenarios related to 
the positions and doing retroactive tests to measure the performance of the 
models.    
c) Monitoring and Review of the Systems 
Banks’ credit concentration limits are detected and these are 
followed on a regular basis. In addition, the rating and scoring systems are 
reviewed at  regular intervals.  
d) Capital Requirement for the Risks of Pillar II 
Some studies are carried out by the banks to determine an additional 
capital against the risks which are outside of the scope of first pillar such as 
the concentration risk, systemic risk, liquidity risk, structural interest rate 
risk, reputational risk and strategic risk. 
To conclude, as Powell (2004) states the correct implementation of 
Pillar II across the globe will develop reliability of the banking sector.  
2.2.2.3 Pillar III: Market Discipline 
 
In Pillar III, the scope and frequency of public announcements about 
the banks’ financial situations, risk levels and the qualitative and 
quantitative information related to their capital structure were determined. 
In addition, the importance of market discipline is emphasized. This 
implementation helps to ensure the financial stability by motivating banks in 
36 
 
a prudent way. The market discipline which depends on the efficient public 
announcements is a complement of supervisory efforts to motivate banks 
about strong risk management systems.  
Basel Committee aims to inform market participants about banks’ 
risk liabilities, risk evaluation processes and their capital adequacy by 
extending the principles of public disclosure. Thus, the comparison between 
the banks can be made and by this way it is possible to ensure transparency. 
The supervisory authority has basically two different data sources.   The 
authority controls the banks’ standardized approaches by collecting data 
with the remote observation and on-site inspection. Moreover, the 
supervisory authority decides the suitability of the banks’ use of the internal 
ratings based and advanced approaches by evaluating the capacity of the 
bank.  
Banks should have a policy about the public announcements.  The 
process of public disclosure needs internal auditing. The statements should 
be consistent with the banks’ risk management and evaluation. It is 
predicted that the frequency of statements should be in every six months in 
the context of market discipline and transparency. However, this frequency 
might increase or decrease in some cases. For example, public 
announcements about the subjects like risk management policies and 
reporting systems may be once a year. 
The general features of the published information about capital 
adequacy can be summarized as follows:  
• Disclosure about the scope of the application 
• Disclosures about the capital 
• Disclosures about the capital and capital adequacy components  
• Disclosure about risk profile 
• Disclosure about credit risk 
• General Information 
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• Disclosure about the information on portfolios 
• Disclosure about credit risk profile 
• Disclosure about credit risk mitigation techniques 
• Disclosure about  securitization 
• Disclosure about market risk 
• Disclosure about operational risk 
• Disclosure about equity investments 
• Disclosure about structural interest rate risk  
 
In the third pillar, an important issue is the compatibility of the 
published disclosure standards with the national accounting standards. In 
Pillar III, it is explained how a bank will give public information about its 
financial situation. In addition, in this pillar, the consolidation of a banking 
group should also be explained. 
Each supervisory authority should develop an implementation plan 
for the Pillar III in accordance with the legal substructure of that area.  This 
plan should take into account the size of the banking system, banks’ level of 
development, the accounting standards, the power and capacity of the audit 
function.  The said plan should determine the requirements of the third 
pillar, analyze the basic deficiencies, develop a progressive course of action 
and consult the obligations with banks and public opinion.  Supervisory 
authorities should evaluate whether they have the power to provide the 
fulfillment of the public disclosure obligations. On the other hand, the 
supervisory authorities should develop their organizational skills and 
expertness for the implementation of Pillar III. These efforts will make 
necessary new human recourses and technology investments.   
In addition, for the supervisory authorities, it may be necessary to 
develop a process to force banks to comply with disclosure obligations.  
This process consists of; 
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• Assessing the reported information in order to evaluate the bank’s 
management, 
• Using supervisory reports for making information to facilitate the 
audit of the banks’ conformity with the public disclosure, 
• Publishing researches which put forward the compliance of the 
banking industry with various public disclosure initiatives and by 
this way, encouraging the market to monitor the level of compliance 
of the banks, 
• Emphasizing the importance of the announcements made by 
the officials to the public, 
• Providing the understanding of the announced information by the 
participants of market and advising the market participants how they 
will react in the absence of these announcements.   
2.2.3 Positive and Negative Views about Basel II 
 
It is important to mention about the positive and negative views 
related to the Basel II Accord. Firstly, it will be appropriate to give place to 
the positive views.  
The main objective of Basel II is to raise the risk awareness of big 
banks – especially those that work in the international market – and prevent 
bad banking implementations with lessons learned from previous crisis. 
While the basic compelling forces behind Basel II are big international 
banks and formal authorities of G10+ countries, its implementation is 
expected to have serious effects on the financial markets of developed and 
developing countries.  
According to Atiker (2005), for Basel II’s economic reflection to be 
positive, many criteria have to work in harmony simultaneously. One of the 
most important points to be considered here is the evaluaton and rating of 
risk. Basel Committee authorized external rating companies under SA & 
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SSA approaches and authorized banks under IRB approach to evaluate and 
rate risk of the markets. Formation of the real data is aimed by this dual 
evaluation and rating system. Thorough rating makes prediction of potential 
crisis will beeasier and taking necessary precautions will be possible. Basel 
I was not sufficient enough for these predictions. It even made the crisis 
deeper in crisis struck countries as credit rating companies decreases the 
credit notes of these countries. By Basel II, this problem is wanted to be 
solved.   
Moreover, Atiker (2005) states that Basel II also functions as an 
economic conjuncture evaluator. In other words, grades of every country, 
company or institution that wants to use credit will be formed according to 
the changes and predictions in the economy. Basel II is sufficient in terms of 
detailed evaluation as the credit ratings of companies and institutions in a 
country will be set according to the economic position of the country. In 
other words, if the grades of credit users are high and risk weights are low in 
a country; it means that this country has a good economy. In a way, these 
credit users will determine the international rating of their country. 
 Basel II is seen both as an opportunity and an area that requires new 
efforts concerning developing countries such as Turkey. As long as there is 
an alternative, Basel II is neither compulsory nor indispensible. As Yayla 
and Kaya states (2005) it is the new regulation standard of the global 
finance sector, although it is difficult and costly for developing countries, 
not adapting can also have extreme costs. The complexity of first pillar 
calculations and the data standards required for advanced approaches 
suggest that short-term application processes will cause problems in some 
banks.  Despite the problems and difficulties, determination for the 
transition to Basel II is expected to have positive effects on the whole 
finance sector in the long term. Focusing on second and third pillars is also 
important as they encourage risk management culture and market discipline. 
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As said pillars focus more on qualitative criteria, their contribution to 
financial stability in developing countries is thought to be substantial. 
According to Arslan (2006) as the risk evaluation for credit user 
SMEs will be made under certain rules and standards with Basel II, 
companies will be realistic in their records regarding commercial activities 
in terms of both collateral requirements and the cost of credit that they will 
use. As this change will result in some infrastructure cost, instead of a 
simultaneous change that will cause high costs and time loss when loan use 
is needed, an effort to implement a planned approach where commercial 
activities are to be recorded transparently over time is necessary. 
As mentioned by Weder and Wedow (2002), if we assume that 
international banks currently consider economic capital that complies with 
the IRB approach while pricing and extending credits, in short; if the 
regulatory capital is not binding, it is possible that Basel II will not have any 
additional effect on prices and credit trends. In other words, expecting a 
dramatic raise in the spreads regarding speculative treasuries (BB+ and 
below) with Basel II and IRB approaches would mean that said debt is 
insufficiently priced by international banks before Basel II. However, the 
capital trends towards developing countries seem to fluctuate although there 
is no change in the regulatory capital. In this context, the reason for Turkey 
to take out fewer loans from foreign countries than Singapore although they 
both have equal regulatory capital need is that they have different risks. 
Powell (2004) claimed that the regulatory capital is not binding. For 
example, in the studies done by Liebig, Porath, Weder and Wedow (2004) 
regarding German banks’ credit trends towards developing countries, 99,5% 
of German banks’ average economic capital is more than their average 
regulatory capital. 
First studies about the effect of Basel II on treasury loans assumed 
that international banks considers regulatory capital while extending credits. 
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Therefore, there were some indications that Basel II will reduce credit 
trends towards developing countries and increase spreads. Griffith-Jones 
and Spratt (2001) claims that Basel II will make the line between developed 
and developing countries clearer and instead of its aim to bring capitals 
closer, it will actually make them farther apart. In addition, later studies 
carried out by Weder and Wedow (2002) or others without the assumption 
of binding regulatory capitals, in other words the studies that take economic 
capital into account, tend to have relatively moderate results.  The results of 
these studies show that Basel II will definitely have an effect on developing 
countries but these effects will remain moderate and it will be impossible to 
ignore them.  
While ratings are determined by the general macroeconomic 
conditions of a country, as Yayla and Kaya (2005) mentioned that capital 
trends can be affected by other factors. Domestic demand in developed 
countries is low as their population growth is slow, their population gets 
older and the infrastructure investments were almost completed. Therefore 
the marginal profit of capital is low in these countries. Because of this 
reason, it is thought that, with the effect of portfolio distribution, the capital 
will continue to move towards developing countries. If the capital only 
moves towards the countries that have high ratings, the spreads of said 
countries will decrease, therefore affecting the profit of international banks. 
That is the reason it is thought that international banks will keep countries of 
different ratings in their portfolio to maximize profit and diversify their 
portfolio in spite of varying costs. In addition, different parameters such as 
growth potential and expectations (such as Turkey’s expectation of EU 
membership) are also taken into consideration while extending credits to 
these countries. A country’s relations with international foundations such as 
World Bank, OECD and IMF can also be decisive while taking international 
loans. However, it is still thought that country ratings will have increasing 
importance due to the capital regime presented by Basel II. Yayla and Kaya 
(2005) claim that countries that secure an investment rating (BBB- and 
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above) will be in advantage. For instance, optimistic evaluation results like 
Powell’s study (2004) show that the costs of countries that have BB- grade 
will not be affected or will be marginally affected by the IRB approach. 
Most of the developing countries, including Turkey, have grades of BB- or 
above. 
Despite the positive views about Basel II, there are also some 
negative views. Studies regarding Basel II’s effects on developing markets 
commenced with the publication of first consultation about Basel II. One of 
the leading studies was made by Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001). This 
study asserts that if international banks that apply IRB approach switch to 
Basel II, the loans available for developing markets will dramatically 
decrease and/or costs of international loans will severely increase. Besides, 
it is stated that risk management based on IRB approach will be pro-cyclical 
– which means it will further depress already depressed economies and heat 
up the economy in times of expansion, therefore causing more frequent and 
severe financial crisis in developing countries. Banks of developing 
countries will need more capital as they will tend to use standardized 
approaches for a while, while international banks will adapt more complex 
approaches that require less capital. Because of this situation, the said study 
states that it will be difficult to compete for national banks with their 
international counterparts, which will eventually lead to a consolidation 
dominated by the international banks in the national banking system.  
Under the view of standardized approaches, as OECD club rules will 
no longer be valid, Yayla and Kaya (2005) claims that it will cause OECD 
member countries that have low credit ratings to be negatively affected by 
Basel II. On the other hand, it is thought that countries that are not members 
of the OECD but have high ratings will have the opportunity to take more 
and/or cheaper loans. That is why it is essential for countries, banks and 
companies to take the necessary precautions in order to increase their 
ratings. In addition, as IRB approaches become widespread, it is possible 
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that those who have grades of BBB or higher will have the opportunity to 
take more loans while those who have grades below BBB will face a 
decrease in the credit supply. As grades equal to BBB and lower than BBB 
are mostly the grades of developing countries, it is claimed that international 
banks will reduce the funding supply towards these countries.   
Internal ratings based approach vastly decreases the need for 
regulatory capital regarding the funding of customers with low delinquency 
risk while the need of regulatory capital increases for the funding of the 
customers with high delinquency risk. As mentioned by Yayla and Kaya 
(2005), banks that adapt IRB approaches may tend to extend credits to 
“higher quality” clients. This may result in a clear separation in the client 
market as clients with low ratings will be funded by local/foreign banks that 
use standardized methods. Customers with low ratings will be faced with 
high funding costs and probably lower service quality or will focus on 
developing new policies (such as transparency, strengthening the financial 
structure and better governance) in order to increase their ratings.  
Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001) assert that with the adaptation of 
IRB approach, spreads of countries with low ratings will tend to have 
dramatic increases. In addition, as Basel II allows the coexistence of 
standardized and IRB approaches, it is claimed that banks that have 
complex business activities will refrain from taking risks (that they will 
remove low quality clients from their portfolios) while banks that have less 
complicated operations will tend to move towards clients that have higher 
risk profiles. According to Yayla and Kaya (2005) the point implied here is 
that international banks will be reluctant to fund developing countries and 
that demand will be satisfied by “smaller” banks. As it is known little 
players of the banking sector tend to follow leading banks behaviorally, 
there is a possibility that said demand may never be satisfied by these 
“smaller” banks.  
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Ratings, given to the countries by rating companies and used in the 
calculation of credit risk by the standardized approach do not direct the 
market as companies can not get information about countries. Thus, rating 
companies were seriously criticized during the Asia Crisis as they failed to 
predict the crisis and they decreased grades of the well rated countries after 
they were struck with the crisis which eventually caused the crisis to 
become even deeper. In a structure controlled by this delayed behavior, risk 
levels of assets change due to the cyclical movements of the economy and 
therefore calculated capital has also a homogenous cyclical movement. 
Banks’ tendency to hold less capital and extend more (excessive) credit 
during expansion periods and doing the opposite during depressions may 
cause serious downsizing. This situation invigorates the boom-bust 
movement in the economy, which causes to the growing of distances 
between bottom and peak points. Similarly, in IRB approaches where 
parameters regarding the borrowers are determined by the bank, 
correspondence with cyclical movements becomes more significant. As the 
risk of delinquency estimated by the bank is homogenous with the cyclical 
movement, delinquency risk decreases if the economy is good and increases 
if the economy is bad. Accordingly, banks’ capital needs are also cyclical. 
Data produced by the banks and rating companies will be a guide in the 
evaluation of the markets. However, as stated by Çelik and Kızıl (2008) if 
the whole finance sector has the same database regarding a region or a 
market, a possible fluctuation in the market will reinforce banks’ tendencies 
to act homogenously. This situation points out that Basel II can trigger crisis 
in financial markets and might undermine crisis management.  
Under the IRB approach, risk weights are calculated by the inward 
prediction of probability of default and loss given default. These predictions 
are based on the data acquired in recent years – at least 5 years for PD 
predictions and at least 7 years for LGD predictions. Giese (2002) asserts 
that default risks are extremely dependent on the conjuncture. Thus, during 
the explosion phase of the conjuncture, default number will be little and 
45 
 
therefore risk weights will be low. This situation will cause to the cheaper 
credits, new investment opportunities while encouraging growth. During the 
economic recession this process is seen vice versa. In this manner the IRB 
approach intensifies the course of conjuncture. 
Basel II encourages the banking system to be profit oriented 
businesses rather than working as public welfare organizations by 
decreasing risk and increasing profit. Çelik and Kızıl (2008) claims that 
almost all of the funds created and turned into credit may move to more 
profitable areas.  It is also possible that the resources will move towards the 
Public and Treasury papers left under the initiative of local supervisory 
authorities as they are evaluated with 0% risk weight and they have not got 
a collateral problem. Also, high real interest rates applied by the Central 
Bank are very appealing for the banks. With this in mind, it is probable that 
credit costs will increase and credit availability will decrease for SMEs.  
Additionally, the risk weight of a company rated below B- is 150% 
and an unrated company’s risk weight is 100%. By Yayla and Kaya (2005), 
this situation is thought to cause companies that think they are in a risky 
position to avoid being rated. The reason that unrated companies are taken 
100% risk weight is thought to be the goal of preventing credit costs for 
SMEs. In this sense, credit rating might be made compulsory for big 
companies. These ratings given by the different rating companies should be 
consistent to maintain confidence. According to Yayla and Kaya (2005) 
some problems under the implementation of standardized approach may be 
as follows; rating companies may damage reliability by policies such as 
exaggerating real ratings and giving “better” grades in order to attract the 
increasing demand. 
Studies done by Claessens and Embrechts (2002) show that country 
grades given by the rating companies follow market movements in a 
delayed manner and all credit companies act slowly when they change 
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grades. Such problems regarding rating companies were not encountered in 
IRB approach. However, there are some views that as IRB approach brings 
high costs for both banks and the supervisory authorities and as it is an 
advanced system that requires suitable data and highly qualified personnel, 
its implementation in the developing countries seems to be unlikely even in 
the medium term. 
In its offer, Basel Committee (2001) assumes that the IRB approach 
requires just 2-3% less capital for credit risk than basically reviewed 
standardized approach, and advanced IRB approach enables 10-20% ease 
for highly advanced banks. According to Giese (2002) it is certain that such 
saving percentages are not enough to encourage banks when it is compared 
with the high bureaucratic costs of the adaptation of the IRB approach 
which is BIS’s declared objective. From the point of view of those who use 
the standardized approaches (essentially all small banks), risk appropriate 
capital allocation will not be possible anywhere except USA and England in 
the near future. Therefore, those who adapt the standardized approach in 
Europe will have to cope with a competitive disadvantage compared to their 
USA counterparts that implement the IRB approach. For example, 
standardized approach predicts 100% risk weight for a highly reliable but 
unrated company, while under the IRB approach the same company’s risk 
weight can be below 20% as it is highly credible. This situation causes a 
competitive disadvantage. To conclude, there is great pressure on European 
banks to adapt the IRB approach. 
2.3 Basel 2.5 Accord 
 
In July 2009, some changes were made to improve Basel II. In the 
first pillar, the changes are about the additional risk, the stressed VAR and 
the calculation of minimum capital in the context of securitization.  In the 
second pillar the risk management was changed and in the third pillar, the 
47 
 
context of public announcements was changed.  These changes are known 
as Basel 2.5 in the public.  
In July 2005 the Basel Committee and IOSCO agreed with several 
improvements for the capital regime of trading book positions. They 
brought some new obligations for the VAR models of banks which measure 
the specific risk and keep capital against default risk. On the other hand, in 
the global crisis started in 2007, important losses occurred in the trading 
portfolios of developed countries’ banks and with the increase of leverage 
effects, the need of amendments on market risk calculations occurred.  
Moreover, some deficiencies were seen in the securitization positions and it 
was understood that the re-securitization positions are more risky than 
securitization positions so serious changes were made in the calculation of 
capital requirements for securitization positions with Basel 2.5. 
2.3.1 Pillar I 
 
While the re-securitization positions were not defined before, a 
definition made on the related positions with the context of these changes.  
According to this definition; the risk pool related to the credit risk is 
separated into pieces and at least one of the risks in the risk pool occurred 
because of the securitization positions, is the re-securitization . In Basel 2.5, 
the risk weights applied to the securitizations under the standardized 
approach are not changed. However, higher risk weights are determined for 
the re-securitizations.   Moreover, risk weights determined for the re-
securitization positions are higher than the risk weights of the securitization 
positions in the internal ratings based approach.  In the supervisory authority 
formula, 7% risk weight of securitization positions increased to %20 for the 
re-securitization positions.  
By Basel 2.5, within the framework of securitization methods in 
Basel II, the use of ratings given  by the credit rating agencies are connected 
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to some specific operational obligations. Otherwise, banks should reduce 
these positions from their equity. With the changes, it is aimed that a bank 
should not trust only to the credit rating agencies and should also make its 
own analysis.  
The banks which apply the standardized approach in the context of 
Basel II use 20% loan conversion rate for the acceptable commitments in 
the liquidity credit allocations which are less than one year maturity and 
50% loan conversion rate which are more than one year maturity. After that, 
it is provided the implementation of 50% loan conversion rate for all the 
acceptable commitments in the liquidity credit allocation independent from 
the maturity.   
In the context of Basel 2.5, in order to measure basic risks within the 
frame of market risk, some regulations added by the Basel Committee. 
These are:  
• Incremental risk charge obligations for the loans which are not 
securitized, 
• The capital requirements which are applied to the securitized 
products are also applied to the trading portfolios. 
• The possibility of adding correlation trading portfolios to the 
comprehensive risk capital requirements due to the provision of 
certain conditions.   
• To be added to the Value at risk, the calculation of the stressed VAR 
is included to the market risk for the first time. 
2.3.2 Pillar II 
 
By Basel 2.5, the aim of the changes on the second pillar is to define 
the risks that a bank or a supervisory authority may encounter in the future. 
On the other hand, Basel 2.5 aims to guide banks and supervisory 
authorities by covering these risks in the internal capital adequacy 
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evaluation processes. From this point, risk management was separated into 
two pieces. These are general risk management and special risk 
management.  General risk management points out that the specifications of 
an healthy risk management should have some features like the board of 
directors and senior management oversight, policy and implementation 
procedures, implementation of limits and controls, risk identification and 
measurement, monitoring and reporting and internal control and audit. On 
the other hand, the context of specific risk management consists of; 
• Risk concentration 
• Off-balance sheet risks and securitization risk 
• Reputation risk  
• Valuation applications 
• Liquidity risk management and supervision  
• Healthy stress test applications 
• Healthy pricing practices 
2.3.3 Pillar III 
 
By the revisions made in the market discipline, it is aimed to solve 
uncertainties on the market by providing more information to the banks 
about the securitization risks, giving more importance to the comments of 
the banks and providing more certain definitions of these risks.  It is 
provided the explanation of the quantitative features of the securitization 
risks on the trading and banking accounts. Moreover, it is pointed out that a 
bank should announce which assets they are planning to securitize in the 
future.     
2.3.4 Criticisms about Basel 2.5 
 
As a result of the amendments made by Basel 2.5, it is seen that total 
capital liabilities of the banks increased 11,5% in average. The major 
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contributor of this increase is the need for additional risk capital. Another 
contributor of this increase is the specific risk capital requirement for the 
receivables of re-securitization. The majority of the countries published 
Basel 2.5 or started to the implementation by giving the final drafts at 
December 2011.   Independently, Switzerland started to implement Basel 
2.5 Accord one year before. According to an article published in the 
Economist Journal (2012), the risk weighted assets of Credit Suisse’s 
investment banking activities increased 28% in the third quarter of 2011 
because of the Basel 2.5.    
Cangürel et al. (2012) point out that Basel 2.5 is criticized as it is a 
quick answer to the 2007-2008 financial crisis with insufficient risk 
analysis. In Basel III preparation process, the early implementation of Basel 
2.5 created difficulties for the banks. In the calculation of the capital need, 
the sum of two different values by the same volatility value which means 
the addition of the stressed VAR to the VAR value is considered that the 
same risk is measured twice. Moreover, in Basel 2.5, the separate 
calculation of the capital requirements, stressed VAR, IRC and CRM causes 
to the pieced risk and it is criticized that the diversification effect is not 
taken into consideration and it causes to the twice calculation. Also, it is 
claimed that this implementation increases operational risks. 
2.4 Basel III Accord 
2.4.1 Transition Process to Basel III 
 
A series of events such as Lehman Brothers announcing bankruptcy 
in September 2008, conversion of big investment banks in the U.S.A. to 
conglomerate bank companies, nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, AIG almost collapsing, fragmentation and sale of Fortis, collapse of 
Iceland’s banking system after their biggest commercial bank’s downfall, 
many countries giving great support to their banks show that necessary 
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precautions are not taken regarding crisis situations yet and the current 
system has some serious shortcomings.  
According to Cangürel et al. (2010) as the financial crisis was very 
costly and very rough, the necessity of some reforms such as liquidity, 
increased capital quality, consideration of the economic cycle and increased 
liability of capital has become obvious for the banking and finance system 
to be more resilient to possible future crisis. 
After the last global crisis, Basel Committee agreed on the Basel III 
standards in order to repair inadequate aspects of formerly promoted and 
implemented Basel II, to suggest new approaches and precautions and 
therefore try to avert possible crisis or at least minimize the damage. With 
this point of view, deficiencies of Basel II can be regarded as the reasons of 
the need for Basel III. Some of the reasons of Basel III Accord are as 
following:  
• Strengthening the capital buffers that can decrease suddenly in negative 
market conditions,  
• Increasing the quality of bank capitals,  
• Implementing a leverage ratio to support Basel II, 
• Decreasing the pro-cyclicality in the need of minimum capital and 
allocating reserve,  
• Strengthening the banking sector by suggesting capital and liquidity 
regulations, 
• Increasing banks’ resistance to stress occasions and enhancing risk 
management. 
Targets to reach with Basel III can be summarized as follows;   
• Increasing the resistance of the banking sector to financial and economic 
shocks wherever they come from,  
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• Enhancing corporate governance and risk management,  
• Increasing banks’ transparency and encourage them to give out more 
information to the public,   
• Increasing banks’ individual resistance via micro regulations,  
• Increasing the amount of current minimum capital, altering its quality 
and in addition to the current practice, implementing a non-risk based, in 
other words accounting based minimum capital requirement standard,   
• Increasing or decreasing the amount of capital on hold according to the 
cyclical periods of economy,   
• Regulating the minimum liquidity ratios,   
• Changing the capital adequacy calculations about the trading book,   
• Changing the calculation of the counterparty credit risk.  
Basel III is not a “revolution” like Basel II, which completely 
changed the method of calculating capital requirement. It is rather a 
supplement that brings a series of new regulations to overcome Basel II’s 
deficiencies observed during the last financial crisis.  
2.4.2 Basic Principles of Basel III 
 
The reform calendar prepared by the Basel Committee was one of 
the most important subjects of the G20 summit held in Pittsburgh on 
October, 2009. The Basel Committee announced said reforms to the public 
with a press statement on September 12, 2010.  
Objectives of the changes in regulation named Basel III are 
discussed in detail below.  
• Better Quality Capital: With the new regulations, only the highest 
capital components (Paid capital is the highest quality component) 
remain in the core capital or common equity, some other capital 
53 
 
components are considered as deductions when calculating the 
common equity.  
• More Capital: Common equity ratio, Tier 1 capital ratio and 
regulatory capital ratio are increased. In this context, common equity 
ratio will be increased to 7% and Tier 1 ratio will be increased to 
8.5% gradually. But 8,5% rate of the Tier 1capital is the necessary 
level to help banks operate in an easier way in some situations (such 
as acting freely when distributing profit). 
• Creating a Capital Buffer: According to the position of the economic 
cycles, the capital that needs to be held can be increased between 0% 
and 2.5%.  
• Non-Risk Based Leverage Ratio: A non-risk based minimum rate is 
planned to be formed between off-balance sheet components taken 
into account under certain turnover rates, total assets and common 
equity. Predicted leverage ratio is 3% (bank could leverage up to 33 
times its equity) and a gradual transition is aimed.    
• Liquidity Regulations: Two rates with minimum levels of 100% 
named Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio are 
planned to be included to the regulations. An extended adaptation 
period up to 2018 is aimed.  
• There are current studies about the calculation capital adequacy 
regarding counterparty credit risk and trading books.  
There are also ongoing studies regarding the areas below;  
• Review of the trading books.  
• Use of external grades in the securitization (within the frame of 
capital calculations).  
• Developing policies regarding systematically important financial 
institutions.  
• Regulations about great risks.  
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• Developing cross-border banking principals.  
• Enhancing standard procedures and strong cooperation between 
bank auditors and supervisory authorities.  
2.4.2.1 Better Quality Capital 
 
The reason for the changes in Basel III regarding the quality of the 
capital is because of the last financial crisis, where it became evident that 
the amounts shown as capital in bank balance sheets were far from being 
qualified to act as functional capital.  
Banks’ most important assets that act as shields during though times 
are the capital they have. The size of the capital is generally seen as an 
indicator of financial power. Basel III is expected to increase the quality of 
capital in banks substantially.  
The scope of equity is changed. The rule that the supplementary 
capital cannot be more than 100% of the core capital and the 
implementation of Tier 3 is revoked.  
Components in Tier 1 that have high potential of loss compensation 
are called common equity. Common equity consists of paid capital, 
undistributed profits, profit (loss), other extensive income statement 
components and prices deducted from this total. 
Regulatory adjustments including over the threshold value 
investments made to financial institutions, mortgage services and delayed 
taxes will be used as deductive components in the common equity as of 
January 1, 2018. Therefore, deduction of these components from common 
equity will be made gradually, starting with 20% in 2014, 40% in 2015, 
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60% in 2016, 80% in 2017 and 100% in 2018. Previous implementations 
will be valid for the remaining parts during this transition process.  
Table 2.5 Capital Differentiation and its Ingredients 
Tier 1 
Common 
Equity 
(CET1) 
• Common shares, minority interests and retained earnings 
are the only qualifying elements  
• Hybrid securities excluded under Basel 3 
Additional 
Tier 1 
(AT1) 
• Instruments classified as liabilities for accounting 
purposes and have loss absorption feature built in                               
• Dated, cumulative instruments no longer qualify as Tier 1 
Tier 2 
Capital 
• Primarily comprised of dated subordinated debt                                                                               
• Diminished importance given Basel 3’s focus on Tier 1 
Tier 3 
Capital 
• Dated, subordinated debt issued to satisfy market risk 
requirements                                                                                     
• Eliminated from capital under Basel 3 
Source: Joyce, T., Dyadyuk, M. & Guzman, J. 2012, The Road to Basel 3, p.57 
 
From now on, 90% of the capital components that are not part of the 
common equity or the supplementary capital will be recognized in the year 
2013, and the recognition rate will be lowered 10% every year so that in 10 
years said components will no longer be regarded as capital components. It 
is possible to see the capital differentiation and its ingredients in Table 2.5. 
 
2.4.2.2 More Capital 
 
More capital is needed in the banking sector to prevent the repetition 
of financial crisis. With this, risks can be lower. As seen in Table 2.6., the 
need for total capital will stay at its current 8% level and therefore it will not 
have to be gradual. Minimum common equity ratio (Common equity/Risk-
Weighted Assets) and Tier 1 requirements will rise to 3.5% 4.5% 
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respectively at the beginning of 2013 from their current levels of 2% and 
4%. Minimum common equity and Tier 1 requirements will be 4% and 
5.5% respectively starting from the year 2014. Final requirements for 
common equity and Tier 1 capital at the beginning of 2015 will be 4.5% and 
6% respectively. 
The capital conservation buffer brought up with Basel III will 
gradually be added to common equity, Tier 1 capital and total capital. Said 
rate is planned to be raised gradually from 2016 to 2019 and reach its final 
figure of 2.5% in 2019. Therefore the total common equity requirement will 
reach to 7%. Plus, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has 
encouraged bigger banks to allocate more capital than 7%, as bankruptcy of 
such banks can cause the whole financial system to crash and burn. New 
laws stay on top of the possibility of the violation of these regulations by the 
banks. If any of the banks lower their capital sufficiency rate below 7%, 
financial authorities can prohibit them from distributing profit to their 
shareholders or paying bonuses to their employees, they may even be forced 
to lower the wages of their employees. 
Caruana (2010) emphasizes that two main duties should be carried 
out in order to effectively limit systematic risks. These duties are:   
• To regulate raise and growth in expansion periods of the financial 
system and to regulate fall and downsizing in recession periods in 
order to balance the rise and fall of the real economy.  
• To consider interdependent and common risks between financial 
institutions for especially significant systematical risks. 
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Source: Delikanlı, İ. U. 2011, Road to Basel-III: Strategies and Priorities of the BDDK, p. 11 
 
 
Table 2.6 Changes in the Capital Requirements 
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In order to overcome the deficiency of Basel II regarding the 
consideration of cyclical behavior of the economy, implementation of a 
countercyclical capital buffer that varies between 0% and 2.5% depending 
on country conditions and preferences has been brought up. Said buffer 
needs to be separated from the common equity or other components that are 
sufficient of full loss compensation. Rapid loan giving growth is aimed to be 
prevented with increasing or decreasing the countercyclical capital buffer 
according to the growth rate of the economy.     
2.4.2.3 Leverage Ratio 
 
A transparent, simple, apparent and non-risk based leverage ratio has 
been brought up. Said rate will be found by dividing the core capital to off-
balance sheet components considered under a certain conversion rate and 
assets (Core Capital / Assets + Off-balance sheet components) and 3% rate 
will be tested parallel application period that will continue until the first half 
of 2017. The final leverage rate will be determined and included to the  
Pillar I on January 1st, 2018, after QIS studies and parallel application 
results are evaluated.  
2.4.2.4 Liquidity Ratio 
 
With Basel III, two rates concerning liquidity named Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio has been formed.  
Liquidity Coverage Rate, which will be calculated by dividing the 
liquid assets of the bank to the net cash outflow in 30 days, has to be at least 
100%. Net cash outflow is the difference between cash outflow and cash 
inflow during a period of 30 days. As this rate’s being less than 1 indicates 
that the bank will have difficulties in covering net cash outflow with its 
liquid assets in western finance institutions, it has to be more than or equal 
to 1. However if the different features of industries and sectors in countries 
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that have high inflation and scarce funding resources are considered, the 
sufficient amount for the liquidity coverage ratio can differ. If the debt 
collection quality is low even if the rate is more than 1, it is a negative 
situation. Whereas in a company that has high stock turnover, the rate being 
less than 1 will not cause any problems. 
Net Stable Funding Ratio is calculated by dividing “available stable 
funding” to “the required stable funding”. Net stable funding ratio has to be 
at least 100% too. While the amount of available stable funding is 
determined according to the maturity dates and qualities of components in a 
bank’s liabilities including Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, the amount of required 
stable funding will be determined according to the due dates and qualities of 
the components in a bank’s assets.   
2011-2015 is determined as a monitoring period for Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio, while 2012-2018 is determined for Net Stable Funding 
Ratio’s monitoring period. After the monitoring periods, it is stated that 
minimum standards for the said rates will be announced. In addition, there 
are ongoing studies about changing the calculation of capital adequacy 
regarding counterparty credit risk and trading accounts.  
2.4.3 Positive and Negative Views about Basel III 
 
The financial crisis in 2008 which was caused by the fluctuations in 
the housing market in the USA and spread all over the world exposed the 
fact that many banks used to function with inadequate quality or amount of 
capital and liquidity. It is well known that banks try to conduct their 
activities with minimum amount of equity and reach the best possible equity 
profit rates. However, functioning with very low or insufficient capital and 
liquidity ratios cause a process of possible losses from loan defaults and 
other investments which might lead to bankruptcy. In the light of all these 
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calculations, it is unanimously accepted that it would be beneficial to raise 
the standards regarding capital and liquidity.  
When all the financial crisis periods are examined, it is seen that 
during positive economic conditions banks tend to extend loan supplies and 
distribute high profits to their shareholders and employees while during 
negative economic conditions they cut resource flow to the real economy by 
retrenching loan supplies and negatively affect economic growth. According 
to Gürel, Bulgurcu and Demir (2012) the most important aspect brought up 
by Basel III is the implementations of “countercyclical capital buffer” and 
“capital conservation buffer” in order to prevent the above mentioned 
negativity. From this point of view, although it might have some short term 
negative effects on banks’ value of equity as it causes the need for 
additional capital, Basel III is expected to positively affect economic growth 
in medium term with its said precautions. Plus, they claim that that a 
banking system with stronger capital structure will be integral in forming 
macro-economical balances.   
Cangürel et al. (2012) emphasize three positive points of  Basel III:  
• The new Basel III package provides a clearer finance sector. It might 
have an important role in order to remove uncertainty.  
• The new Basel III package combines micro and macro level 
prudence developments. The goal is to form proper capital plans in 
order to cope with systematic risk and evaluate the increase and 
decrease trends caused by the economic developments of the 
financial system. Basel III tools will be suitable to limit systematic 
risks.   
• An appropriate and long enough transition period is planned with 
Basel III. Generally approved transition regulations will support loan 
giving while helping the banking sector to meet higher capital 
standards by proper income protection and capital increase.   
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To sum up, the reports issued such as “Assessing the macroeconomic 
impact of the transition to stronger capital and liquidity requirements” and 
“An assessment of the long-term economic impact of stronger capital and 
liquidity requirements” (2010) by BIS estimate that the long term global 
average of the common equity/risk weighted assets ratio was 7% before the 
crisis; and if that ratio is increased 1% along with the implementation of the 
liquidity standards brought up by the Basel Committee, probability of crisis 
will be reduced from 4.6% to 2.3%. 
However, there are also negative criticisms about Basel III. Cangürel 
et al. (2010) state that economy and growth figures are expected to be 
adversely affected when the banks aiming a certain equity profit in order to 
have additional capital and liquidity tend to raising loan intermediation costs 
and move towards loans and investment tools that are classified as having 
lower risk weight to meet the obligations about common equity and core 
capital; as this situation will result in less loan and more interest rates for 
medium and small scaled companies that are rated with higher risks.   
Hasbu (2010) points out: one opinion suggests that new regulations 
will ensure that there will be no bankruptcy regarding banks in the event of 
a new financial crisis, while another opinion claims that these regulations 
will force banks to have billions of dollars of reserves when that money can 
be used to help revitalizing the economy during the time of recession. Both 
these views have their supporters among big nations. While U.S.A and U.K 
want to implement these new regulations as soon as possible (at the latest 
2018), Germany prefers to implement new regulations in 2023, when they 
are sure that the economy is out of recession.  
Brown (2010) expressed that Karl-Heinz Boos, president of the 
German Public Banks, has stated that loan giving abilities of the German 
Banks will be limited to a great extent with the new regulations. Therefore, 
Cangürel et al. (2010) denote that time and calendar of implementation of 
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these new regulations called Basel III is greatly important.  They also point 
out that there are concerned parties claiming that the implementation of new 
regulations in a strict and quick way may damage the global economy 
recovery process and may cause serious recession or financial depression. 
BIS took these concerns into consideration and the changes spread over a 
large period of time. 
The most important benefit of the higher capital and liquidity ratios 
announced by the Basel Committee is that they reduce the possibility of 
financial crisis. However the effectiveness of increasing the minimum 
capital and liquidity ratios to reduce the possibility of financial risk is 
ambiguous.  
Brown (2010) states that implementation of Basel III regulations will 
be easy for big banks which were rescued by the tax payers but it will be 
difficult to meet new capital and liquidity obligations for the local 
commerce banks that have problems to meet the capital adequacy ratio in 
advance.  Lehman Brothers was compatible with Basel III regulations on the 
day it was bankrupt. As Matai (2010) indicates Lehman Brothers was 
crowing about its 11% Tier 1 capital ratio to be almost three times more 
than the regulatory capital just five days before its collapse. 
As Auer, Pfoestl and Kochanowicz (2011) claim that banks’ 
available capital will reduce because of the strict capital definition and the 
increased risk weighted assets for securitizations, trading book positions and 
counterparty credit risk exposures. According to the Quantitative Impact 
Study (2010) full implementation of the Basel III Accord would reduce CET 
1 Capital by more than 40 percent. Also, the new leverage ratio which is 3% 
may limit banks’ scope of action. For these reasons, meeting the required 
capital adequacy ratio will be very difficult for some banks.  
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Blundell - Wignall and Atkinson (2010) point out that many finance 
experts and bankers criticize that Basel III does not bring anything new to 
the flaws in risk weighting which was the basic problem of the previous 
crisis. Blundell - Wignall and Atkinson criticize that Basel II Accord’s 
weakest point is that portfolios with high risks are shown as possessing low 
risk through different derivative products and also while calculating capital 
adequacy these high risky portfolios taken into account as low risky by the 
banks. Banks do this by purchasing insurance contracts such as Credit 
Default Swaps which are not subject to any regulations. For instance, it is 
stated that AIG, the biggest seller of these kinds of contracts, went at the 
brink of bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 showed that these contracts 
were a cheat.  
Cangürel et al. (2010) give place to another criticism about Basel III: 
banks will tend to move towards high rated public loan tools that are 
classified as low risky and as a result, the banks’ portfolios will carry 
country risks in a serious proportion and also the private sector companies 
that have lower rates will enter to financial impasse as they will not be able 
to acquire funds.  
Cangürel et al. (2010) maintain that in order for Basel III to be 
successfully implemented globally, all supervisory authorities in the world 
have to coordinate. Otherwise, a movement towards the countries that have 
less supervision from those that strictly implement the regulations brought 
up by Basel III will occur; therefore the global result expected from Basel 
III will not be accomplished.  
The adaptation period is made long and gradual in order to minimize 
the cost of implementation of these new regulations. Although it reduces the 
cost, this long of transition period has raised some concerns. The most 
important of these concerns is that a long transition period will prevent a 
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quick adaptation of the new regulations, therefore causing the Basel III 
implementation to fail the desired level of success. 
To conclude, as Auer et al. (2011) claim that related to the 
geographical area and lines of business of banks, the impact of Basel III will 
change from institution to institution. For instance banks which have more 
exposure in trading positions, a significant securitization portfolio, larger 
activities in derivatives, repo-style operations and securities financing 
activities will have more problems than others.
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3. TURKISH BANKING SYSTEM AND BASEL ACCORDS 
3.1 Basel I and Turkey 
 
Turkey accepted Basel I in 1988 which was published in that year 
and  followed a gradual process in terms of application.  Turkey applied 5% 
in 1989, 6% in 1990, 7% in 1991 and 8% in 1998 as the capital adequacy 
ratio. Following the crisis and developments, upon realizing that the 
formula, which only takes into account the credit risk is inadequate and that 
market risk has an important role in financial structures, market risk was 
added to the formula by the Basel committee in 1996. In Turkey, after the 
crisis in 2000 occurred because of the high exchange rate levels and interest 
rate fluctuations, BRSA brought the obligation to calculate the capital 
adequacy ratio by including market risk. 
According to the 1988 Basel Accord, in OECD countries, the 
responsibilities of the banks are different from the banks which are not in 
OECD countries.  All banks’ claims’ which have less than 1 year maturity 
weighted at 20%, OECD countries banks’ longer-term claims are also 
weighted at 20% but non-OECD countries banks’ longer-term claims are 
weighted at 100%. According to Basel I, Turkey was in an advantageous 
position since it is an OECD country. Because of this reason, the risk weight 
of the treasury bonds is 0% in Turkey. 
Finally, it can be stated that Turkish banking system has been 
developing rapidly.  By these developments, foreign investment rates have 
increased. For this reason, it has gained great importance to comply with the 
international standards in the banking sector.  It is only possible to catch 
international banking standards by applying the Basel Accord and Basel 
Committee’s suggestions. 
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3.2 Basel II and Turkey 
 
Considering the positive and negative effects, Basel II is evaluated as 
an efficient opportunity for Turkish banking system by BRSA. While taking 
into account the international wideness of Basel II, delaying the 
implementation of these regulations may create some unpredictable costs. 
In general, BRSA (2005) highlight the anticipated advantages of 
Basel II:  
• Increasing effectiveness of the banks’ risk management, 
• Using banks’ intermediary functions  in an effective way,  
• Being parallel the banks’ capital level with the risks they exposed, 
• Increasing market discipline with the banks’ public 
announcements, 
• Recovering management structures of the banks’ customer 
companies.   
As a result of high technological level of Basel II, it is needed to 
invest on human resources and information technology in an important 
level.  Some effects of Basel II are independent from the implementation of 
it. For example, a foreign bank using Basel II Accord and providing fund to 
Turkish Treasury or Turkish banks, is enough for experiencing some effects 
of Basel II in Turkey. BRSA (2005) evaluates Basel II as a strategic 
building block for a bank to manage efficiently the risks, not as an editing or 
a calculating tool.  
According to the results of quantitative impact studies, Basel II 
reduces the capital adequacy in a certain degree. However, capital adequacy 
level of Turkish banking system is high so this negative impact is not 
important for Turkey. According to the results of QIS-TR1 (2004), the total 
capital adequacy ratio for 23 bank, participating to the study, was 28.8%  
but the ratio decreased to 16.9% after the implementation of Basel II. It can 
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be observed that in QIS-TR2 (2007), the capital adequacy ratio decreased 
5.6 points from 19.31% to 13.68%. In the QIS-TR3 study (2011), the ratio 
decreased 1.4 points from 18.35% to 16.95%. Considering the minimum 
capital requirement of Basel II which is %8, the capital adequacy of Turkey 
will be more than twice after the implementation of Basel II. As Yayla and 
Kaya (2005) point out, that is why, the excess capital of Turkey will make 
the transition process to Basel II easier. On the other hand, with the 
recovering process in the macroeconomic environment and with the 
implementation of Basel II, the loan proportion and the risk-weighted assets 
of banks may increase.  
The decrease in the capital adequacy ratio is basically related to the 
high capital obligations of Basel II for the foreign currency denominated 
treasury bills and bonds and the operational risk which is added to the 
capital requirements. As specified by BRSA (2005), within the framework 
of Basel II, the 8.7 points of 11,9% decrease is the result of foreign currency 
denominated treasury bills and bonds and 2 points of 11.9%  is related to the 
operational risk. On the other hand, the decrease in the capital adequacy 
ratio because of the loans given to the companies is 1.2%.  
In the quantitative impact studies, the provisions of Basel II were 
applied to the current portfolios of banks. Possible changes on the banks’ 
portfolio preferences, customers’ credit value and macro level financial 
market were not taken into account in case of the implementation of Basel 
II. If some changes occurred in these fields, the effects of Basel II on the 
banks’ capital liabilities may be different. For example, when the rating 
score of Turkey exceeds BBB level (investment grade); the capital 
requirement for the foreign currency denominated securities will decrease 
fifty per cent from 100% to 50%. Moreover, capital requirements will also 
decrease when the companies which are the clients of banks take good 
rating scores. Thus, the effects of Basel II on the banks’ capital 
requirements are expected to be better than the results of quantitative impact 
studies.  
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In the context of Basel I, it was not an obligation to keep capital for 
the banks both the domestic and foreign ones, which make investment to 
Turkish treasury securities because Turkey is an OECD country. However, 
in the frame of Basel II regulations, it is predicted 8% minimum capital 
requirement for the foreign currency denominated government securities 
(Eurobonds and debt securities denominated in foreign currencies) because 
of the low rating score of Turkey. On the other hand, BRSA should 
determine the capital adequacy ratio for the government securities indexed 
to the Turkish Lira and foreign currencies. In the quantitative impact 
studies, BRSA determined this rate as 0%. 
There are some opinions that Basel II will restrict the flow of funds 
to the developing countries. It should not be forgotten that the big banks 
which are the largest provider of funds, take into account the countries’ 
rating score, while determining the price of funds. In other words, risk-
based capital allocation and pricing cases which were already implemented 
will be a rule with Basel II. In this perspective, BRSA (2005) predicts that 
there will be no important changes in the cost of the Turkish treasury 
foreign borrowings because of the Basel II. 
According to Basel II, the banks except foreign banks are subject to 
100% risk weight, if the borrower bank uses the standardized approach. In 
Basel II, while calculating the credit risk by the standardized approach, 
foreign currency securities’ risk weight are determined according to the 
country’s rating.   In this context, Turkey’s risk weight is 100% because of 
the credit score of Turkey is scaled as BB. Banks, which give loans to 
Turkish banks, may evaluate the credit risk with the ratings given by the 
international rating agencies. As a result of this, according to Yayla and 
Kaya (2005) the amount of the loans might decrease or the cost might 
increase, because of Turkey’s 100% risk weight. Especially, development 
banks will be affected by this issue because development banks have the 
biggest share in the foreign currency securities of Turkey.    
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Basel II predicts different risk management skills for each bank. 
Thus, the risk management methods show some differences according to the 
banks’ scale and level of complexity. It is thought that Turkish national 
banks will apply the standardized approach easily. However, it has been 
known that there are some data limits in the advanced approaches. Çalışır 
and Şahin (2011) denotes that the presence of unregistered companies in 
Turkey and the structure formed by the missing data based on the 
accounting records which are not standard and banks’ existing scoring 
system are important issues and this fact creates the need of a careful 
planning in the compliance process with Basel II. On the other hand, the 
borrowers, especially SMEs in Turkey have not got  a rating score and 
Yayla and Kaya (2005) claims that this issue creates another limit for Basel 
II. These issues create the need of some calculations in line with Basel I. 
Ayan (2007) claims that foreign banks in the Turkish banking sector 
may see Basel II as an advantage to reduce their costs. On the other hand, it 
has been thought that the transition to Basel II is needed for an effective 
banking system in Turkey. 
While calculating the capital adequacy for credit risk, according to 
Basel-II, a part of Turkish banks (small banks) planning to implement the 
standardized approach. However a part of banks (medium banks) which are 
planning to implement IRB approach specify that they are going to use 
standardized approach at first and then they will pass IRB approach step by 
step. Operational risk definition which comes into a question after Basel II 
is the most important theme that the banking sector has been focused on 
because Turkey has a stable effort for the implementation of Basel II. In the 
investigations made, the concentration of the banking sector increased on 
the Pillar-I stage which has the most complex structure and long term 
preparation process.  
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The most obvious effects of Basel II Accord on the Turkish banking 
sector, is available with 3 structural blocks. In the context of first Pillar, 
operational risk added to the calculation of capital adequacy and some new 
methods were added in order to measure the credit risk. Second pillar gives 
some responsibilities to the banks as developing the internal evaluation 
processes and risk management skills, defining the capital targets and 
keeping capital more than the minimum capital requirements.  Third pillar 
clarifies the public announcement issues and defines the scope, shape and 
frequency of these public announcements.  
While investigating the crisis economies, it is observed that Turkey 
has experienced a serious devaluation in 2001 and as a result of this, many 
banks bankrupted. As for the Turkish banking sector, some wide scale 
regulations implemented after the economic crisis. These regulations are a 
part of the transition process to Basel II Accord. In 2001, a regulation comes 
into force which brings some restrict rules for banks’ internal risk 
management systems. According to this regulation, banks should establish a 
risk management department and by this way an effective risk management 
system should be created.  From this continuous process, banks who make 
important investments for human recourses and technological developments 
try to make their systems ready. At the current stage, most of the banks 
established internal rating systems and started to create a data set. Also, in 
2002, a regulation which adds the market risk to the capital adequacy 
measurement came into effect. There is no doubt that these efforts are 
important for Basel II harmonization process.      
Taşpınar (2007) indicates the possible effects of Basel II in the 
Turkish banking sector: 
a) Basel II will bring more effective and disciplined banking system. 
b) Basel II will develop modern risk management techniques. 
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c) In Basel II the countries risk weight increases from 20% to 100%. 
This situation will increase interest costs of the syndicated loans 
which are taken from foreign banks and will decrease its amount.  
d) Basel II brings 8% of minimum capital requirement for the domestic 
and foreign banks which invest to the bonds, debt securities and 
Eurobonds exported by the Treasury due to the 100% risk weight of 
the country. 
e) Basel II decisions will contribute to the establishment of corporate risk 
and control culture in the Turkish banks by the settlement of effective 
risk management and internal control system. In addition, Basel-II 
will lead a healthy growth by making a contribution to the risk-based 
audit within the framework of an effective risk management. In this 
sense, the adequacy and effectiveness of the internal control system 
which has a 20% risk weight in the total risk factors will be extremely 
important. 
f) In the context of Basel-II regulations, implementing an effective risk 
management brings the need of a powerful equity structure and this 
need will increase the capital requirements.  
g) Basel II will bring a need of a capital adequacy which is a risk-
sensitive against the risks that the banks are exposed to. 
h)  The principle of “Separation of Power” will be used more efficiently 
between the banks’ marketing, operation and allocation groups.  
i) Basel II will contribute to the banks’ implementation of intermediary 
functions in an effective way.    
j) Basel II will lead banks to use risk indicators list effectively. 
k) With Basel II, importance of the maturity of loans will increase and 
for the loans which have less time remaining to the maturity, banks 
will allocate less capital than others. 
l) Basel II will contribute to the provision of the market discipline with 
the information that a bank should announce to the public. 
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m) Basel II will increase the importance of risk management for banks 
and will help the banks to develop suitable risk management skills for 
the different risk scenarios.  
n) Basel II decisions will bring additional investment costs in the banks 
for the information technologies and human recourses.   
o) Basel II Will bring significant changes in banks’ risk appetite and risk 
perceptions. 
p) With the implementation of Basel II decisions, the risk level of the 
loans given by the banks will affect banks’ loan cost.  In this period, 
the importance of ratings given to the companies by the independent 
rating agencies will increase. The lower rating score of a company 
will raise the banks’ loan costs. Thus, the cost of a loan given to a 
lower rated company will increase.  
q) Banks’ customer portfolio preferences will be companies who have 
high credibility and solid structure. By this way the loan interest rates 
for these companies will decrease.  
r) Increasing concentration of banks on the companies who have high 
credibility and low risk level will cause to the increased competition 
among the banks due to the pricing, reputation risk and regulatory 
capital arbitrage. 
It can be said that Turkish banking sector in which the independent 
supervisions made, internal control and risk management functions 
performed and modern risk management techniques implemented, is ready 
for Basel II. 
3.2.1 Problems Encountered by Turkey in the Process of 
Preparation for Basel-II 
 
In this section, the main problems encountered during the Basel II 
preparation process are summarized. In the Turkish banking system the 
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insufficient risk culture causes some important problems about the activities 
related to Basel-II. 
Basel II Accord is needed to invest in human recourses and 
information technologies because of its high technological level. According 
to BRSA (2006) resource allocation is the most important issue for the small 
and medium scaled banks in the preparation process. Another important 
difficulty for the banks which are planning to use advanced methods is the 
lack of collecting qualified data from a single source. The main reason of 
the difficulties about collecting data are the differences between the Basel 
requirements and banks’ current data collecting systems and the lack of 
companies which have efficient documentation and accounting system. For 
this reason, the necessity of some regulations on the real sector is emerged 
with Basel II. BRSA (2006) points out that in the banks whose consolidation 
process continued or completed, the problems about combining information 
systems and customer data caused disruptions on the preparation process of 
Basel II. However, it is possible to overcome these problems only by the 
regulations and decisions taken in the frame of national initiative. 
Office programs and web based software are used in order to operate 
loss database of the operational risk. In addition, the data obtained 
retrospectively are identified by the internal control and inspection reports 
and the accounting records and then transferred to the database. BRSA 
(2006) indicates that the most important difficulties about creating database 
are related to the reaching loss data from the past periods and quantifying 
the amount of losses.   
In the banks, the transactions which cause operational loss are 
subject to analysis frequently. Some precautions are established in order to 
overcome these losses by investigating the business lines in which the 
operational risks are high. In addition, some pre-warning systems are 
formed against the components creating operational risk. Moreover in some 
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banks, self-assessment studies are applied in order to determine the points 
that constitute the operational risk. According to the study results, it is 
planned to create risk matrixes and hide the obtained information with the 
loss data in the operational risk database. By the studies conducted, it is 
aimed to identify and rate level of operational risks. On the other hand, in 
some banks, risk maps are prepared. In the self-assessment studies, it is 
aimed to quantify the operational risks by using these maps.  
3.2.2 Comparison of QIS-TR3 Results with QIS-TR2 Results 
 
The contribution amounts (the variation of the contribution of the 
related portfolio to the risk-weighted assets at the transition process from 
Basel I to Basel II) which were calculated by the QIS-TR2 (2007) and QIS-
TR3 (2011) are shown in Table 3.1. While evaluating the table, it should be 
taken into consideration that there are differences between QIS-TR2 and 
QIS TR3 about the size of the included positions to the calculation, the 
banks included in the study and the regulatory provisions. 
Table 3.1 Portfolios' Contribution to the Risk Weighted Assets 
PORTFOLIOS CONTRIBUTIONS (%) QIS - TR2 QIS-TR3 
 Trading Books 6.29 5.18 
 Public Portfolio 18.58 7.05 
 Banks Portfolio 2.69 1.34 
 Non-SMEs Corporate Loan Portfolio 4.43 1.66 
 SMEs Corporate Loan Portfolio 1.44 0.41 
 Real Estate Loans Portfolio 
-1.53 -1.4 
 Retail SME Loan Portfolio 
-1.5 -1.64 
 Other Retail Loan Portfolio 
-7.08 -4.18 
 Equity Investments Portfolio 0.0 0.0 
 Investments to Subsidiaries Portfolio 0.28 -0.01 
 Operational Risk 14.54 0.0 
TOTAL 38.1 8.41 
Source: Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu, 2011, Basel II Sayısal Etki Çalışması (QIS-TR3) 
Değerlendirme Raporu, p. 53 
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QIS-TR2 study was done with September 2006 data and QIS-TR3 
was done with March 2010 data. In QIS-TR2 study, 31 banks were included 
to the study from 50 banks and in QIS-TR3 45 banks were included to the 
study from 49 banks. Moreover, there are some differences between the 
provisions taken into account about the calculation capital adequacy. In 
addition, when QIS-TR2 was applied, there was not capital adequacy 
calculation for operational risks in Turkey. However; in the current 
legislation, banks should keep capital for the operational risk and this issue 
creates a big difference between QIS-TR2 and QIS-TR3.  
The total contribution of QIS-TR3 shows important difference from 
the total contribution of QIS-TR2. When this difference is analyzed, the 
most important issue is that the operational risk contribution which is 
%14,54 in QIS-TR2 is %0 in QIS-TR3. Secondly, the important decline in 
the public portfolio is conspicuous. The 18,58% contribution of public 
portfolio in QIS-TR2, falls 11 points and became 7.05% in QIS-TR3. The 
reason of the high contribution of public portfolio in QIS-TR2 is that 
foreign currency denominated receivables of banks from the Turkish 
Treasury and Central Bank of Turkey had 0% risk weight in Basel I but they 
have %100 risk weight in the context of the standardized approach. In 2006, 
the share of foreign currency denominated securities which were included to 
QIS-TR2 was 6,72% but this rate declined to 1,49% in QIS-TR3.  In 
addition, the fall of the foreign currency receivables in balance sheets of the 
banks decreased the negative effect of public portfolio on CAR in QIS-TR3.  
In the both quantitative impact studies, retail loan portfolio reduced 
the Risk Assessment Value. In QIS-TR2, this decrease was 8,58%, in QIS-
TR3 it becomes 5,82%. The main reason of this decrease is the less share of 
retail credit portfolio in the total RAV in QIS-TR3 period. Another 
remarkable point is the contribution of the corporate loans. The total 
contribution of corporate loans (Corporate SMEs and other corporate) 
reduced from 5,87% to 2,07% in QIS-TR3. Finally, the total contribution of 
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SMEs (Corporate and Retail SMEs) loans increased from -0,06% to -1,23% 
and this caused to the increase of CAR. As a result of the negative impact of 
SMEs loans on RAV, the cost of loans will reduce. Thus, by looking to the 
results of QIS-TR2 and QIS-TR3 it can be said that Basel II will have a 
positive effect on SMEs funding. 
Briefly, it is observed that the absolute contribution of all portfolios 
except retail SMEs loan portfolio declined in QIS-TR3. Because of this 
reason BRSA (2006) claims that after the implementation of Basel II, the 
minimum capital which the banks should keep will not change in an 
important manner and the stability of Turkish banks will not affected. 
While comparing QIS-TR2 and QIS-TR3, examining not only the 
contributions of the portfolios but also the changes of portfolios in RAV 
will be helpful. The shares of the portfolios in the sum of RAV at the QIS-
TR2 and QIS-TR3 are shown in Table 3.2. Moreover, there is a decline in 
the loan portfolio given to the public, banks and SME’s (Corporate and 
Retail SMEs) and the investment done to the subsidiaries portfolio. 
Especially, the decline in the public portfolio is a remarkable point. The 
reason of this remarkable decline is related to the decrease of the foreign 
currency denominated securities on the banks’ balance sheet. On the other 
hand, in the increasing RAV shares, the important point is the non-SMEs 
corporate loan portfolios. It is increased from 20,87% to 31.83%. At this 
point, the remarkable point is the decline of the contribution of non-SMEs 
corporate loans from 4,43% to 1.66%, although the share of these loans 
increased. 
It is thought that the increase of the share of non-SMEs corporate 
loan portfolio in RAV depends on the SME definition, which is different in 
QIS-TR2 and QIS-TR3. In QIS-TR3, a rule added to the definition of SME, 
an enterprise can become a SME if the number of employees is 250 or less 
than 250.  For this reason, several companies move from the corporate SME 
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portfolio to the non-SMEs corporate portfolio. Another reason for the 
decreasing contribution of the non-SMEs corporate loan portfolio is the 
real-estate loans.  
Table 3.2 Changes of Portfolios in the Risk Weighted Assets 
PORTFOLIOS RAV SHARE (%) QIS - TR2 QIS-TR3 
 Trading Books 7.23 9.84 
 Public Portfolio 14.78 7.11 
 Banks Portfolio 4.83 4.77 
 Non-SMEs Corporate Loan Portfolio 20.87 31.83 
 SMEs Corporate Loan Portfolio 9.59 6.53 
 Real Estate Loan Portfolio 2.03 2.65 
 Retail SMEs Loan Portfolio 10.78 7.72 
 Other Retail Loan Portfolio 12.21 12.29 
 Equity Investments Portfolio 0.067 0.003 
 Investments to Subsidiaries Portfolio 1.06 0.43 
 Other Assets 5.8 3.64 
 Operational Risk 11.45 13.16 
Source: Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu, 2011, Basel II Sayısal Etki Çalışması (QIS-TR3) 
Değerlendirme Raporu, p. 53 
In QIS-TR2, these types of properties could not be used as a 
collateral; however in QIS-TR3 these kinds of mortgages have 35% or 50% 
risk weight because of Turkey’s use of national initiative. When we look to 
the other components of loan portfolios, there are some small increases in 
RAV shares expect the decreases in the SMEs portfolios.  
3.2.3 Progress of Basel II in Turkey 
 
Creating the strategies and policies become a priority for the banks 
in the Basel II transition process. Important part of the banks in the sector 
prepared these strategies and policies and started to apply. Others continue 
to renew their strategy and policies. In the “Progress Report on Basel II 
Implementation” of BRSA (2012), it is shown that, the banks which are 
nearly 63% of the total sector worked about the strategies or policies of 
Basel II. Moreover 99% of the banking sector created superior management 
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team in order to work for Basel II. When the situation is evaluated, it is seen 
that banks which constitutes 47,7% of the total asset size of the market 
made an individual based transition to Basel II and 28,5% of the banks 
made consolidated based transition to Basel II by receiving approval from 
their board of directors about their strategies and policies. 
BRSA (2012) evaluated the banks’ compliance status of the credit 
risk, market risk, operational risk and second and third pillars of Basel II 
Accord according to their answers to the survey done in 2012. It can be seen 
that 55% of the banks adjusted to the basic internal ratings based approach 
and 46% of the banks adjusted to the advanced internal ratings based 
approach between the values of 50% and 100%. However, in the 
securitization process, the compliance of the banks was under 50%. All of 
the banks adjusted to the standardized approach in the market risk. The 
banks which are highly compatible (75% - 100%) with the internal ratings 
measurement methods, is 86% and 83% respectively. In the operational 
risks, 73% of the banks adjusted to the standardized approach over 50% but 
in the internal-ratings based approach, this rate stays at 60%.  It can be seen 
that 93% of the banks adjusted to the rules of Pillar III between the 
percentages of 50-100. According to the banks’ answers, the main problem 
is data missing in PD, LGD and EAD. Moreover the regulatory uncertainties 
and the lack of technology are other missing points. On the other hand, 
qualified personal, budgeting and understanding of Basel II are not 
important problems. 
In order to calculate the regulatory capital, Turkish banks’ current 
systems and infrastructures are convenient to use:  
For the credit risk; 
- 43.2% Basic Internal Ratings Based Approach 
- 12,2% Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach 
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For the market risk; 
- 94,5% Internal Measurement Approach 
For the operational risk; 
- 28,7% Standardized Approach, 
- 32,6% Advanced Measurement Approaches.  
In the context of Basel II, important part of the banks are planning to 
use internal ratings based approach in order to calculate credit risk. Only 
5,2% part of the banking sector declared that they will continue to use 
standardized approach.  92,9% of the banks declared that they are planning 
to use Advanced Internal Ratings Based approach.  
Table 3.3 Necessary Time for Turkish Banks to Use Advanced Methos 
Year Corporate Banks Treasury Receivables 
Corporate 
SME 
Retail 
SME 
Other 
Retail 
0 0.1 2.1 5.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
1 24.6 12.5 9.3 12.4 9.2 9.2 
2 32.3 13.6 13.6 33.4 36.6 40.4 
3 9.5 22.7 22.7 9.5 9.5 4 
4 11.6 21.3 21.3 22.7 22.7 12.8 
4+ 19.6 17.2 17.1 19.51 19.5 29.5 
Not Prepared 2.6 9.9 10.1 2.7 2.7 3.4 
Source: Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu, 2012, Bankacılık Sektörü Basel II İlerleme Raporu, p. 9 
In Table 3.3, it is possible to see when the banks will start to use 
advanced measurement methods for credit risk in their different portfolios 
after the implementation of Basel II.  It can be understood that banks need 
more than two years even if the legislation is ready to use. An important part 
of the banks predicted more than two years especially in the receivables 
from the banks and Treasury portfolio. For these two portfolios, 10% of the 
banks did not declare any preparation. In addition, 2-3% of the banks did 
not declare any preparation for other portfolios.  
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In addition, all of the banks in the banking sector have been using 
basic indicator approach to calculate capital need for operational risks since 
the end of December 2011. 2.4% of the banks are planning to use basic 
indicator approach in the future in order to calculate operational risk 
regulatory capital. 78,7% of the banks are planning to continue to use 
advanced measurement approaches and 15,8% of the banks are aiming to 
use standardized methods. Moreover, according to the results of the survey, 
85% of the banks are planning to use advanced measurement approaches 
earliest in 2014 and over 50% of the banks are planning to use advanced 
measurement approaches earliest in 2016. 13,8% of the banking sector 
declared that they are planning to use advanced methods by 2013 to 
calculate operational risk.  
The banks which are 96,7% of the banking sector use internal 
approaches to calculate market risk. Nearly all of the risk measurement 
methods used by the banks cover the currency risk and market risk. 
According to this, 98,4% of the related models used by the banks covers 
currency risk and 94,7% covers general market risk.  In addition, 64,9% of 
the related risk measurement models covers commodity risk, 39,6% covers 
counterparty credit risk and 23,7% covers specific risks.   
Moreover, the banks who are 34,7% of the whole banking sector, are 
planning to switch to the implementation of economic capital allocation and 
60% of the banks are in the establishment stage of the economic capital 
allocation model. The ratio of banks who has economic capital allocation 
model, is 3,8%.  Also, by the answers of the survey, it is understood that 
84% of the banks make measurements by defining the structural interest rate 
risk. On the other hand, 85% of the sector defined the context of the 
liquidity risk and use it in the analysis and 49% of the banks defined credit 
concentration risk and make risk monitoring on the related risks.     
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On the other hand, in the context of Pillar III, it is stated that banks 
are largely compatible with the public disclosure obligations except the 
portfolios subjected to IRB approach.  Banks’ compliance to the public 
disclosure obligations were evaluated within the framework of foreseeable 
risks of the first and second pillars:  the banks which own approximately 
%65 of the sector’s total asset size are largely or fully compatible with the 
public disclosure obligations about the credit risk under the standardized 
approach. However this ratio is 0.40% under the IRB approach. In the 
market risk, the banks which own 68.20% of the sector’s total asset size are 
compatible with the public disclosure obligations under the standardized 
approach . Moreover, it is seen that 20.8% of the sector are compatible 
under the IRB approach. In the operational risk, 20.7% of the sector are 
partially compatible and 1.90% are not compatible about the public 
announcements. In terms of operational risk, the large or full compatibility 
ratio of the announcements is 67.7% of the sector. 
3.2.4 Implementation of Basel II in Turkey 
 
In Turkey, the parallel implementation period of Basel I and Basel II 
finished and from the beginning of July 2012, Turkey started to apply only 
Basel II.  
According to the reports given to BRSA at March 2012, 1,2 point 
CAR decrease is expected. Despite this decline, the capital adequacy ratio 
does not decrease under the regulatory and aimed ratio. As it is known, in 
Basel I, the criteria of OECD membership was used while giving the risk 
weights to the assets. However in Basel II standardized approach, risk 
weights are calculated according to the credit ratings. Countries’ 
supervisory authorities can use their initiative for the receivables from 
countries’ treasuries and central banks. By this initiative, it is possible to 
give a risk-weight between 0-100% to the national currency denominated 
and funded receivables. Thus, foreign currency denominated public 
receivables have 100% risk weight due to the Turkey’s current rating.  On 
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the other hand in the context of national implementation choices, the 
domestic currency receivables from the Turkish Treasury and Central Bank 
are subject to 0% risk weight if they are funded in TL currency.  
In the current approach; 
• The housing loans which have 50% risk weight will be weighted as 
35% under Basel II standardized approach. 
• According to Basel I, the cash secured corporate loans have 0%, real 
estate secured loans have 50% and other loans have 100% risk 
weight. In Basel II, these risk weights determined according to the 
corporates’ ratings.  
• In Basel I, retail and SMEs loans have 100% risk weight, however if 
these receivables have a credit protection, the risk weight may 
decrease. In Basel II, these kinds of receivables classified in 75% 
risk weight. Non-rated companies will be weighted in 100%. 
• Individual credits which should be weighted in 75% will be 
weighted between 150% and 200%. 
3.3 Basel 2.5 and Turkey 
 
As mentioned before, Basel 2.5 focuses on developing of the lacking 
points of market risk calculation methods of Basel II and determines the 
capital requirements occurred from the securitization positions. In the 
current legislation, the amount of market risk is calculated by using the risk 
measurement models or standardized method; however the usage of risk 
measurement models is subject to the permit of BRSA. At present, there is 
no approved bank from the BRSA in order to use risk measurement model 
for calculating the market risk. On the other hand, the securitization 
operations used in the sub-standard mortgage market which are shown as 
the main reason of the global financial crisis are not used in Turkey widely. 
For this reason, it is expected that Basel 2.5 suggestions will not have 
important consequences in Turkey. 
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3.4 Basel III and Turkey 
 
When past and current studies are considered, it is obvious that 
Turkish Banks will not need a great deal of capital if they adapt Basel III 
regulations. The structure of capital in the Turkish Banking system shows 
that the ratio of capital like loans in equities are low, whereas common 
equity components such as paid capital, profit reserves and undistributed 
profit are higher.  
The concept of Tier 1 in Basel III represents the core capital with 
some changes in Turkey’s legislation. Supplementary capital is called Tier 
2. Some of the said changes are below;   
• Assets deducted from capital are deducted from the total of core and 
supplementary capital in Turkey when calculating the equity, while in Tier 1 
calculation ADCs are deducted as 50% from the core capital and 50% from 
the supplementary capital.   
• The minimum capital adequacy ratio is formed in respect to the 
(Core Capital + Supplementary Capital - ADC) / RAV ratio. On the other 
hand, while our current legislation has no direct minimum capital adequacy 
ratio for Tier 1, the rule that prohibits the supplementary capital from being 
more than 100% of the core capital assures that the ratio of the core capital 
is high. 
Table 3.4 Equity Items of Turkey 
As of June 2010 Amount(*1000TL) Percentage 
Tier 1 Capital 113.055.045 91.2% 
Paid in Capital 46.297.649 37.3% 
Retained Earnings 62.430.683 50.4% 
Other 4.326.713 3.5% 
Tier II Capital 12.320.900 9.9% 
Tier III Capital 0.0 0.0% 
Deductions 1.392.234 1.1% 
Total Own Funds 123.983.711 100.0% 
Source : Delikanlı, İ. U. 2011, Road to Basel-III: Strategies and Priorities of the BDDK, p. 17 
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As seen on Table 3.4, total core capital (Tier 1 Capital) forms 91.2% 
of total equity and supplementary capital (Tier II Capital) is 9.9%. Paid-in 
capital and retained earnings which are the most important components of 
the core capital, form 37.3% and 50.4% of the total equity capital 
respectively and indicate that the sector is functioning with a high quality 
capital. The Tier III capital component removed from equity calculations 
with the implementation of Basel III did never exist in Turkey so this 
situation will not affect Turkey’s banking sector. In consideration of the 
information above, Cangürel et al. (2010) claim that the difference between 
capital adequacy and common equity adequacy ratio in Turkish banks will 
be less than those of USA and Europe. This subject is more important for 
the banks of USA and Europe as components that are not defined as 
common equity but take place in the total capital are high. In addition, the 
fact that Turkey had set a minimum target rate of 12% in the year 2006 in 
addition to the accepted 8% capital adequacy rate are the most effective 
proactive precautions in order to prevent the banks from having capital 
shortages. The capital adequacy ratio of the Turkish Banking Sector is 
19.2% as of June, 2010 and 16.5% as of June 2012, which is well above 
both the regulatory limits and the target rate.  
The liquidity ratio that is calculated for a one-month term in Turkey 
is largely compatible with the Liquidity Coverage Ratio brought up with 
Basel III. In fact, Cangürel et al. (2010) indicate that when the changes 
brought up by Basel III are examined from the point of content, subjects 
regarding liquidity and capital buffer are largely in line with the proactive 
precautions taken by the BRSA before the financial crisis. For example, the 
regulations and the additional acid-test ratio implemented by the BRSA in 
2006 brought up principals regarding liquidity risk evaluation and 
management while Basel II did not determine any standards about the 
evaluation of liquidity risk in the Pillar II. Said regulations implemented by 
the BRSA contributed greatly to Turkish banks’ smooth functioning without 
liquidity problems during the global crisis.  
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Similarly adapted “Tighten in expansion, loosen in recession” 
philosophy and “Target Capital Adequacy Ratio” implementation brought 
up by the BRSA can be viewed as proactive precautions. Cangürel et al. 
(2010) claim that by the general framework of effective liquidity 
management formed with both a strong and well supervised banking system 
and experiences from previous crisis, Turkey has entered the global crisis 
period very well prepared.  In this context, a series of precautions are taken 
regarding the foreign exchange market and the banking system foreign 
exchange liquidity with the monetary policy exit strategy carried out by the 
Turkish Central Bank.  (Suspending of foreign exchange purchase biddings, 
commencing of foreign exchange sale biddings, restarting foreign exchange 
deposit broking activities, deducting two points from the compulsory 
foreign exchange cash reserve ratios, raising the export rediscount loan 
limit, etc. ) With the said regulations, Turkish Central Bank need to take 
additional radical precautions lowered and the bank’s balance sheet 
structure remained intact. On the other hand, while Basel III Accord allows 
banks to leverage their equity up to 33 times, this rate is 12 times in the 
Turkish banks so it is possible to say that the leverage border will not limit 
Turkish banks. 
According to Cangürel et al. (2010) in situations where the CAR is 
close to the minimum level, the subject of failure of raising assets, in other 
words loans and unsecured loans might come up. Outcomes of the 
crowding-out effect may vary, depending on the conjuncture of the 
economy (acceleration or deceleration of economic growth) and priorities 
(growth or fighting inflation).  In order to analyze as such, the CAR has to 
be close to the minimum level. However, said rate is considerably high in 
Turkey and it is difficult to state that the minimum level of the CAR will 
have a negative effect on growth in the current situation.
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4. GENERAL VIEW OF TURKISH BANKING SYSTEM 
 
While the effects of the global crisis on the international financial 
markets are still continuing, CBRT (2012) denotes that Turkish banking 
sector is protecting its powerful and healthy structure. By the contribution of 
capital inflows and implemented flexible monetary policies, the value of the 
Turkish Lira remained stable compared to other developing countries. In 
general, the upward trend of the loans including seasonal effects remained at 
reasonable levels. As it is desired, credit growth is mainly resulted from the 
corporate loans and the growing rate of the consumer loans is slower. 
General structure of the loans consists of Turkish lira denominated and mid-
long term loans and this tendency is evaluated as positive about the 
management of credit risk.  
With the implementation of Basel II on July 2012 although a limited 
decline is expected in the capital adequacy ratio, the CAR will be above the 
legal ratio which is 8% and the target ratio which is 12%. In this context, 
CBRT (2012) predicts that there will be no difficulty with Basel III Accord 
which Turkey’s compliance process is still continuing. Thus, within the 
framework of Basel III regulations, for the Turkish banking sector the share 
of the common equity (that includes elements which have a high capacity to 
meet loss) in Tier 1 capital is approximately 90% as of March 2012. The 
profitability of the sector started to rise with the first quarter of 2012. 
The re-increase of the sector profitability and the creation of retained 
earnings without distributing the profits strengthen equities of the banking 
sector. Although there are so many uncertainties on global financial 
markets, Turkey has no problem with providing funds from foreign 
countries. The strong structure of banking sector has positive effects on the 
financial stability.  However, it is inevitable to implement macro-prudential 
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measures in order to protect financial stability against fast changes of the 
global markets. For instance, export rediscount credits which strengthen 
foreign currency reserves and balance foreign trade by supporting export 
sector are another policy tool. Moreover, the limits of these credits which 
are given via Exim Bank, increased and some facilities are done for using 
these kinds of credits.     
On the other hand, statutory reserves have been used since 2010 in an 
active way to decrease macroeconomic and financial risks and protect 
financial stability. The statutory reserves’ liabilities are differentiated 
according to their maturities and this contributed to the decrease of the 
banks’ asset-liability maturity mismatches. While taking into account the 
rapid increase of the loans, the statutory reserves are increased in several 
times especially for the short-terms loans. From the second half of 2011, 
discounts were done in the statutory reserves because of the financial 
problems in the developed EU countries and deceleration in the global 
economy to provide liquidity. 
4.1 Balance Sheet Sizes 
 
In Table 4.1, balance sheet sizes of the banking sector between the 
years 2000 and 2009 are given. The rapid increase of the total assets is 
remarkable. The share of financial assets in total assets increased until 2003 
and gradually decreased after 2003.  Also, the share of loans in total assets 
increased. This increase indicates that banks directed from the government 
securities to the loans. In the liabilities part of balance sheet, it is observed 
that banks continue to grow based on deposits and increase in deposits 
between 2000 and 2009 is 641%. 
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Table 4.1 Turkish Banking Sector Balance Sheet Sizes (2000-2009) 
Billion TL 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Assets 104,1 166,4 216,5 250,7 307,2 397,8 485,8 562,3 708,4 801,8 
Liquid 
Assets 21,5 38,5 34,4 36,3 43,0 63,2 74,2 74,8 100,9 102,6 
Financial 
Assets 12,0 16,9 86,1 106,9 123,7 143,0 168,3 175,9 207,8 280,9 
Non-
Performing 
Loans 
1,5 4,3 3,7 1,0 0,8 0,8 0,8 1,1 2,5 3,2 
Credits 34,2 41,0 56,4 70,0 103,2 153,1 218,1 280,5 366,9 381,0 
Non-
Current 
Assets 
13,9 51,6 18,3 19,3 22,1 20,1 17,3 19,2 19,7 22,5 
Other 21,0 14,1 17,6 17,2 14,4 17,6 7,1 10,8 10,6 11,6 
Liabilities 101,9 164,2 212,7 249,7 306,5 397 484,9 561,2 705,9 798,5 
Deposits 68,4 117,1 142,4 160,8 197,4 253,6 312,8 357 453,5 507,3 
Non-
deposit 
Sources 
19,8 26,6 31,5 39,1 45,3 66,9 87,2 91,6 125,2 137,7 
Equity 5,0 9,7 25,7 35,5 46,0 53,7 58 73,5 82,7 106,5 
Other 8,7 10,7 13,1 14,3 17,8 22,7 26,8 39,1 44,5 47,1 
Source: Coşkun, M. N., Ardor, H. N., Çermikli, A. H., Eruygur, H. O., Öztürk, F., Tokatlıoğlu, İ., Aykaç, G., 
Dağlaroğlu, T. 2012, Türkiye’de Bankacılık Sektörü Piyasa Yapısı, Firma Davranışları ve Rekabet Analizi, p. 32 
Banks' return on assets and return on equity are shown in Table 4.2. 
Return on assets is calculated by dividing a company’s annual earnings to 
its total assets. On the other hand, return on equity is calculated by dividing 
a company’s net income to the equity. The data shows that the Turkish 
banking sector is developing.  It can be observed that the profits in the 
banking sector increased continuously except for the year of 2008. 
Moreover, as stated by Coşkun et al. (2012) it might prove an increase of 
the profits because of the decrease of the competition pressure in the system 
or the limited level of competition in the market.  
Table 4.2 Return on Assets and Equity 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Return on Asset -3,6 -3,8 1,4 2,2 2,1 1,4 2,3 2,6 1,8 2,4 
Return on Equity -89,8 -69,9 11,2 15,8 14,0 10,6 18,9 19,5 15,5 18,3 
Source: Coşkun et al. 2012, Türkiye’de Bankacılık Sektörü Piyasa Yapısı, Firma Davranışları ve Rekabet Analizi, p.49 
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Table 4.3 gives the opportunity to compare asset sizes of the Turkish 
banking system with 27 EU countries and some selected member countries. 
While comparing the total assets in 2008, European Central Bank (2010) 
points out that Turkey was in 15Th place among 27 EU countries.  Especially 
2008 and 2009 are the years that the crisis is felt seriously in the Euro zone. 
In the Euro zone, the total asset sizes of credit institutions, insurance 
companies, mutual and pension funds were interrupted in the second quarter 
of 2008. On the other hand, the total asset size of banking sector continued 
to grow. ECB (2010) indicates that in 2009, the total assets of the banking 
sector in the euro zone composed 75% of the total system which consists of 
insurance companies and investment and pension funds. In this context, 
despite the financial crisis, assets continue to grow on average in the Euro 
zone because of the rapid growth of the banks’ assets of new member 
countries. 
Table 4.3 Asset Sizes of EU and Turkish Banking System 
Billion Euro 2002 2008 
EU27 25.312 42.209 
Turkey 127 343 
UK 5.856 8.840 
Germany 6.370 7.875 
France 3.832 7.225 
Italy 2.024 3.628 
Holland 1.356 2.235 
Luxemburg 663 932 
Greece 202 462 
Source: Coşkun et al. 2012, Türkiye’de Bankacılık Sektörü Piyasa Yapısı, Firma Davranışları ve Rekabet Analizi, 
p. 62. 
The financial assets of Turkey had 11% improvement of the total 
GDP between the years 2003 and 2007. The most important factor which 
contributed to this improvement is 26% decline of the net debt ratio of the 
public sector (Central Government and Central Bank), 10% increased 
leverage by the household and 5% increase of the non-financial sector. As a 
result, the net liability of the economy takes place at 8% of the total GDP. In 
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2008, net financial position increased because the value of TL depreciated 
and net financial liabilities of the companies increased. As a whole, in 2009, 
net financial assets showed an improvement. 
Compared with the previous year, in December 2011, the total assets 
of the Turkish banking sector increased 21% nominal, 9.5% real and 
became 1.218 billion Turkish Liras as seen in Chart 4.1. Thus, the total 
balance sheet size of the Turkish banking sector to GDP ratio increased 
from 91.6% (December 2010) to 94% in December 2011. In March 2012, 
the asset size of the banking sector was 1.229 billion Turkish Liras. 
Chart 4.1 Turkish Banking Sector Growth (Billion TL,%) 
 
Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası, May 2012, Finansal İstikrar Raporu, p.35 
 
4.2 Credits 
 
A comparison with the Euro zone might draw a picture of the 
lending capacity of the Turkish banking system. In Table 4.4, the credit 
stocks of the Turkish banking system, 27 EU countries and some selected 
countries are shown.  
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Table 4.4 Credit Stocks of EU and Turkey 
Billion Euro 2002 2008 
EU27 11.076 19.275 
Turkey 30 172 
UK 2.195 5.118 
Germany 3.022 3.229 
France 1.370 2.290 
Italy 1.066 1.808 
Holland 704 1.098 
Luxemburg 132 203 
Greece 95 221 
Source: Coşkun et al. 2012, Türkiye’de Bankacılık Sektörü Piyasa Yapısı, Firma Davranışları ve Rekabet Analizi, p. 63 
 
Through the measures taken during the crisis like the changes 
occurred in the profitability rates and decreased interest rates provided an 
improvement in the banks’ profits and capital ratios by the high interest 
margin. This improvement also compensated the increased non-refundable 
credits during the crisis period as seen in Chart 4.2. 
Chart 4.2 Increase in the Non-Refundable Credits  
 
Source: Coşkun et al. 2012, Türkiye’de Bankacılık Sektörü Piyasa Yapısı, Firma Davranışları ve Rekabet Analizi, p. 193 
 
 
 
Because of the fragile structure of the global financial market, credit 
growth lost momentum in many countries. In parallel with the developments 
in the local and global financial markets, the ratio of the credit growth to 
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GDP in USA, UK and Japan continue to decrease in 2011 but in the 
developing countries, the ratio remains high in spite of the loss of 
momentum as it can be seen in Chart 4.3. 
Chart 4.3 Credit Growth / GDP (%) 
 
Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası, May 2012, Finansal İstikrar Raporu, p.37 
 
4.3 Deposits  
 
Deposits and the share of deposits in total asset are shown in Table 
4.5. The change of deposits in the total assets shows diversity from one 
country to another.  The share of deposits in the total assets decreased in 
Turkey, France, Italy, Greece and Luxemburg while it increased in UK, 
Germany and Holland. ECB (2010) asserts that the reason of the increased 
deposits in some of the member countries’ banking system in 2008 and 
2009 is the banks’ efforts to collect deposits which are stable resources due 
to the increase in the interest rates. Another reason of the increased deposits 
in the total assets is the household’s transfer of financial resources from the 
non-banking sector to the banking sector as it is safer. 
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Table 4.5 Assets of EU and Turkish Banking System and Deposits to 
Assets Ratio 
  
2002 2008 
Billion Euro Deposits/ Assets Billion Euro 
Deposits / 
Assets 
EU 9.104 36 16.788 39,8 
Turkey 83 65,4 209 62,1 
UK 3.347 57,2 5.857 58,5 
Germany 2.446 38,4 3.067 39 
France 1.078 28,1 1.670 23,1 
Italy 764 37,7 1.189 32,8 
Holland 539 39,7 1.001 44,8 
Greece 134 66,3 281 60,8 
Luxemburg 200 30,2 263 28,3 
Source: Coşkun et al. 2012, Türkiye’de Bankacılık Sektörü Piyasa Yapısı, Firma Davranışları ve Rekabet Analizi, 
p. 68. 
 
4.4 Capital Adequacy and Equity 
 
In Turkey, the capital adequacy ratio of banking system which has 
decreased since the beginning of 2011 showed a limited increase at the end 
of the year. The capital adequacy ratio is quite above the legal ratio which is 
8% and target ratio which is 12%. As seen in Chart 4.4, in March 2012, the 
CAR value of the Turkish banking sector is increased 0,1 points and became 
16,6% which was 16,5% at the end of 2011. CBRT (2012) points out that 
the reason of the limited increase in the capital adequacy ratio of the sector 
is the improvement in the profitability performance and the slowdown in the 
credit growth. On the other hand, the share of Tier I capital in the total 
equities was about 90% in March 2012 and this shows the high quality of 
the equity components of the sector.  In fact, Tier I capital ratio reached a 
high level which is 14,9% at the end of 2011. 
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Chart 4.4 Capital Adequacy Ratio - Turkey (%) 
 
Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası, May 2012, Finansal İstikrar Raporu, p.54 
 
Moreover, it can be seen in Chart 4.5 that the equity to assets ratio 
was in a rising tendency and it was 11,9% at the end of 2011 and 12,5% in 
March 2012.    Equity structure of the banking sector is positively affected 
from the increase of the sector’s profitability performance and securities 
fund, the limitation of the banks’ distribution of profits by the BRSA and 
from the provision of important amount of retained earnings by this way.  
However, by the implementation of Basel II in July 2012, a limited decrease 
in the capital adequacy ratio is predicted.  
Chart 4.5 Equity to Assets Ratio - Turkey (%) 
 
 Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası, May 2012, Finansal İstikrar Raporu, p.54. 
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Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası, May 2012, Finansal İstikrar Raporu, p.54. 
Chart 4.6 Country Based CAR and Equity to 
Assets Ratio (%) 
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Compared  to other countries, as seen in Chart 4.6 Turkey is among 
the countries that has high rates in the capital adequacy ratio and the equity 
to assets ratio. Despite the expectations about the decrease of the CAR in 
the transition process to Basel II/2.5, the sector will maintain its current 
level of profitability performance and will protect its strong capital 
structure. Also, while there will be a limited decline in CAR by the 
implementation of Basel II in July 2012, it is predicted that the CAR will be 
still above the legal ratio (8%) and the target ratio (12%). In this context, it 
is expected to have any difficulty in the transition process to Basel III whose 
compliance efforts are still going on. In Turkey, within the framework of 
Basel III regulations, the share of common equity including components that 
have high capacity to meet loss in the Tier 1 capital are at the levels of 90% 
as of March 2012. 
 
4.5 Liquidity Adequacy  
  
One of the main reasons of the last financial crisis was the extreme 
leverage rates and the weak liquidity situation of the banks. The possibility 
to establish Turkish Lira statutory reserves as gold and foreign exchange 
affects the banking system positively through the liquidity and cost 
channels. By this way banks’ need of Turkish Lira liquidity and their 
borrowings from the Turkish Central Bank reduced. Although the ratio of 
the liquid assets to the total assets deteriorated, it is possible to see in Chart 
4.7 that the total liquidity adequacy ratio of the banking sector is above the 
legal rate which is 100%. It can be said that the liquidity ratio of Basel III 
will not negatively impact the profitability of the Turkish Banking Sector. 
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Chart 4.7 Liquidity Adequacy Ratio - Turkey 
 
Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası, May 2012, Finansal İstikrar Raporu, p. 46. 
 
4.6 Portfolio Investment Liabilities in Turkey 
 
Portfolio investments are includes public or private sector’s bonds, 
securities, stocks and other money market instruments. Portfolio 
investments are classified as assets and liabilities under the main headings: 
equity and debt securities. There are many national and international factors 
which affect the increase and decrease of the foreign capital flow.  These are 
general macroeconomic stability, national economic growth, exchange rate 
stability, interest rates, liquidity of the stock market, general situation of the 
foreign banking system. 
As seen in Chart 4.8, 2001 and 2008 are the years which portfolio 
liabilities of Turkey are in the lowest level because of the 2001 Turkish 
economic crisis and 2008 global financial crisis. The sum of Turkey’s 
liabilities to the foreign countries was 601,3 billion dollars as of November 
2012. Provided net foreign source was 62 billion dollars in the first 11 
months of 2012 and approximately 57% of this foreign source flows to 
Turkey by the portfolio investments. 
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Chart 4.8 Portfolio Investment Liabilities in Turkey 
Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası 
 
Especially, the portfolio investments have accelerated  in July 2012.  
Foreign investors made investments to the securities and bonds in Turkey 
because they found the financial assets’ prices as cheap and returns as high. 
They think that returns will decrease and prices will increase in the future 
because Turkey’s current accounts deficit tended to fall after the extreme 
increase in 2011, inflation was high but it has a tendency to decrease and 
there was a expectation of increase in Turkey’s credit rating.  Also, the 
depreciation of Turkish Lira in the second half of 2011 and first three 
months of 2012 became effective in the decisions of foreign investors. 
 The Institute of International Finance predicts that flow of funds to 
the developing countries will gain momentum in 2012 because of the rapid 
economic growth of these countries and very low interest rates.  According 
to the data of Institute of International Finance (2012), capital flows to the 
developing countries will reach to 1,026 billion dollars in 2012 and 1,100 
billion dollars in 2013. On the other hand, Fitch increased Turkey’s credit 
rating from BB+ to BBB- which is the adequate level to become an 
investable country and this situation may affect positively the funds flow to 
Turkey.
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5. DISCUSSION 
5.1 Basel I Accord and Necessity for Basel II Accord 
 
 As mentioned before, because of the global financial crisis occurred 
in 1970 and 1974 and adopted liberal economic policies in many countries, 
Basel Committee issued Basel I Accord in order to make banks’ structure 
stronger which are the most important actors of the capital market. With this 
accord, Basel Committee tried to establish a risk based relation between the 
assets of the international banks and their capital. 
Basel I Accord focused on the minimum capital in order to minimize 
the costs of the depositors in case of a bankruptcy. The methods which are 
used by Basel I for measuring the market and credit risks that a bank is 
exposed are;  
• Lacking of measuring banking risks in a realistic way,  
• Unable to take into account the price fluctuations in the financial 
market, 
• Unable to supervise the differences of the banks’ portfolio 
creating behaviors. 
Because of these reasons, the expansion of the scope of Basel I 
Accord and creation of more precise risk measurement and management 
methods became increasingly a necessity.  
In order to resolve the shortcomings and make healthier the risk 
measurement methods of Basel I, Basel II Accord was established in 2004 
by the Basel Committee. It is possible to see the main differences between 
Basel I and Basel II in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1 Comparison of Basel I and Basel II 
Basel I Accord Basel II Accord 
Taking into account only credit and 
market risks while calculating CAR 
Making CAR more sensitive against risks 
and taking into account operational risks 
while measuring the credit risk 
OECD membership differentiation 
while determining the ratings related 
to the credit risk 
Use of the ratings given by the rating 
agencies to measure credit risk 
Using only one risk measurement 
method 
While providing alternative methods for 
each risk category, encouraging banks to 
use internal measurement methods 
Same treatment by the supervisory 
authority to all financial institutions 
Putting emphasis on importance of the risk 
management and spread of the risk culture 
Putting emphasis only on CAR  
Putting emphasis on CAR, the necessity of 
the audit and supervision and necessity of 
the market discipline 
 
5.2 Reasons of the Global Financial Crisis 
 
All the regulations done could not avoid the problems which started 
in the USA estate market and the spread of the crisis from the developed 
countries to developing counties.  
Firstly, the most important factor of the crisis is the securitization. 
By the securitization, new financial assets were created and these assets 
were sold to the investors in the whole world. Globally, regulations related 
to the banking sector give banks the opportunity to keep the risk out of their 
balance sheets by the securitization of credit. The new financial products 
like the structured credits and the ability to exclude risks out of the banks’ 
balance sheets and large-scaled complex banking system became effective 
in the spread of liquidity crisis from the banking system to USA markets 
and the whole world. In addition, the other important reason of the crisis is 
the weak underwriting. The meaning of the weak underwriting is the 
implementation named “risk layering”. Instead of the traditional 
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mechanism, a bank who gives mortgage loans did not keep these assets until 
their date of maturity and sells these assets by securitizing them with 
financial intermediaries’ channels. In that system, the bank or intermediary 
who gives the loan is not affected from the repayment of the borrower 
because the lender disposes of the loan before its date of maturity comes. 
Moreover, in that system unlike the traditional banking system, the lenders 
are not curious about the correct evaluation of the loan.  By the Recourse 
Rule which is an American amendment of the Basel Accord, the capital 
amount that banks should hold against the securitized assets is associated to 
the rating system.  Friedman (2009) gives an example: 
  “Under the Recourse Rule, American commercial banks were 
required to hold 80 percent more capital for the commercial loans, 80 
percent more capital for the corporate bonds, and 60 percent more capital 
for the individual mortgages than they had to hold for the asset-backed 
securities, including mortgage-backed securities rated AA or AAA.” 
By this regulation, banks reduce the amount of capital that should be 
kept by collecting the mortgage loans into a pool and by securitizing these 
assets instead of holding them in their balance sheet.  
In the spread of crisis derivative markets became also effective. 
These markets served as a mechanism which spreads the crisis between the 
financial markets and financial intermediaries. Derivative markets expanded 
globally because financial intermediaries meet capital adequacy ratio by 
hedging the derivative products and gain some advantages about risk 
management by decreasing the VAR value. The most important decision 
taken by the Basel Committee in 1998 is that a bank should increase the 
amount of capital for risky assets. However, the capital adequacy rules 
determined in the Basel I Accord contains more lax regulations for the 
mortgage loans and mortgage backed securities compared to the commercial 
and consumer loans. By using the derivative products, banks can hedge the 
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market or credit risk so they can keep less capital for the risks related to 
other activities or trading transactions. Thus, the over-the-counter derivative 
markets increase the leverage ratio and gives the opportunity of entering 
equity swap transactions to the big scaled banks and investment banks. 
Moreover, the cause of the banks to retain securities with high credit quality 
is the regulations developed about the capital adequacy by Basel II. The 
capital adequacy ratio varies according to the expected risk from the 
investments. For example, if a bank holds a Treasury bill or government 
bond of a relatively safe country, it should separate less capital against 
possible risks. Before the global financial crisis, mortgage backed securities 
with high credit quality, CDO’s and similar type of securities were assessed 
as low risk weighted and the regulatory authorities thought that these types 
of securities are safe.    
Another distortion in the financial system which was seen before the 
crisis is the increase in the leverage ratios. One of the reasons which 
increase the leveraged transactions is the rise of the rate of return on capital 
due to the finance of financial institutions’ portfolios with less capital by 
ignoring the risk.  Another reason of the banks’ operations with high 
leverage ratios is to gain superiority against bank branches that have a fixed 
cost and against legal regulations by growing their balance sheet.  Banks’ 
increase of the leverage ratios and growth of balance sheets cause to the 
expectations about the rise of asset prices and this creates an asset bubble. 
Basel II regulates the minimum capital to risk weighted assets ratio which 
are in the banks’ portfolios.  However, this ratio is not a direct constraint on 
banks’ leverage ratios. Extreme leverage ratios make the banks’ balance 
sheets quite sensitive against possible losses.  
Furthermore the shadow banking system became effective in the 
spread of crisis. The loan funding was granted by the non-banking financial 
institutions such as investment banks, hedge funds, money-market funds and 
financial companies. These are called as shadow banking system and the 
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biggest player is the investment banks. This system is not under the control 
of a supervisory and regulatory authority. In addition, in this banking system 
there is any obligation to share information with the public as the 
opportunity to share information is given to the company’s own authority. 
One of the premises of the crisis is that the rating agencies do not 
fulfill timely and sufficiently their obligations  As it is known, the rating 
agencies which give ratings to the banks and other financial institutions are 
financed by these banks and institutions either.  In this structure, the 
objectivity of these rating agencies declines. 
On the other hand the capital adequacy fulfilling efforts of the 
financial institutions increased the impact of the crisis. The decrease of the 
assets value caused a decline in the capital of financial institutions. In order 
to meet the capital adequacy ratio and restore confidence of the customers, 
financial institutions provided new capital from outside or decreased their 
leveraged positions. In other words, they narrowed the size of their balance 
sheet by selling the assets without looking to the price of them or by 
reducing the loans that they give.  Coşkun et al. (2012) claim that the recent 
regulations about the capital standards made by the Basel Committee will 
improve the amount and quality of the financial institutions’ capital. 
5.2.1 Global Financial Crisis and Basel II Accord 
 
Basel II Accord became effective in the 2008 financial crisis or not? 
To answer this question it is important to take into consideration the two 
different views of the writers who accuse Basel II Accord for the financial 
crisis and who see Basel II Accord as an advantage to provide financial 
stability and to prevent future financial crisis.  
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5.2.1.1 Quality and Quantity of Banks’ Capital Suggested by 
Basel II Accord  
 
The quality and quantity of banks’ capital suggested by Basel II 
Accord is adequate or inadequate to prevent a financial crisis? There are two 
different approaches of writers to this question. In one side Onado (2008) 
claims that Basel II is not a regulation which increases the inadequate 
capital level in the banking sector and the CAR remains same with Basel I. 
Also, Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) claim that Basel II regulations 
does not include sufficient capital for the capital market activities of banks 
like securitization which is the main reason of global financial crisis. On the 
other side, there is an idea of Cannata and Quagliariello (2009). According 
to their view, the required capital level remains same because BIS aimed a 
progressive pass from Basel I to Basel II. Moreover, Basel II gives 
importance to the development of risk management policies by the banks 
and supervisory authorities for the financial stability. They suggest that 
effective internal controls are more important than large capital 
requirements. Benink and Kaufman (2008) state that capital requirement of 
many banks under Basel II is less than Basel I Accord’s required capital 
which can be seen in the Quantitative Impact Studies. For example, QIS 
results show that the USA some largest banks’ required capital decreased 
more than 50%. Cannata and Quagliariello (2009) know that it is true but it 
is an advantage for the regulators to give incentives to the banks for the 
implementation of more advanced risk measurement methods.  
5.2.1.2 Relation Between Fair-Value Accounting and 
Implementation of Basel II Accord  
 
The relation between fair-value accounting which is an international 
accounting principle for trading books and implementation of Basel II 
Accord caused important losses in the intermediaries’ portfolios or not? 
According to Zingales (2008), due to the fair-value assessment, banks 
increase their capital or decrease lending when there is a balance-sheet 
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losses. However, Cannata and Quagliariello (2009) said that any regulation 
which set a rule for the minimum capital will lead a problem like this. The 
vulnerability of banks’ balance sheets resulted from the implementation of 
Basel II standards and the new accounting principles in the same time and it 
can be prevented by some prudential filters. 
5.2.1.3 Pro-Cyclicality of Basel II Accord 
 
The pro-cyclicality of Basel II caused to the business cycle 
fluctuations or not? Blundell -Wignall and Atkinson (2010) support the idea 
that the leverage ratio is high in good times and low in bad time or it is easy 
to use counterparty credit policies in good times but it is difficult to use 
them in bad times. Moreover, Goodhart and Persaud (2008) assert that Basel 
II does not include a counter-cyclical control mechanism to prevent credit 
booms. Otherwise, Cannata and Quagliariello (2009) mention about the 
efforts done by the Basel Committee to decrease the effects of the pro-
cyclicality such as the implementation of more favorable risk-weights for 
less cyclical borrowers like SMEs and development of capital buffers which 
can be used in bad times. However, they also claim that the pro-cyclicality 
is a feature of any capital regulation which reduce the likelihood of banks’ 
defaults and provide greater coherence between capital and risk. 
5.2.1.4 Independency of Rating Agencies  
 
The rating agencies which calculate the credit risk under the 
standardized approach are independent or not? Greenberg (2008) claims that 
while the main duty of the rating agencies is to be an independent referee, 
they originate securities for maximizing their own income. Cannata and 
Quagliariello (2009) affirm that the assessment of the credit risk by the 
rating agencies is a development in the risk management process even the 
ratings are incorrect and it can encourage banks to improve their internal 
rating methods. Moreover, they think that the regulations of the European 
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Commission done in 2008 such as the creation of common standards for the 
internal organization and methodologies of the rating agencies and 
development of the requirements for their registration will be beneficial to 
overcome these problems. Also, Phillips (2008) suggests that the ratings 
given by the rating agencies should be verified externally and relying solely 
on these agencies is a big mistake. 
5.2.1.5 Banks’ Internal Measurement Models  
 
 Banks’ internal models to measure risks became effective in the 
financial crisis or not? According to Benink and Kaufman (2008), the main 
problem of Basel II is the use of internal models by the banks to determine 
the risk and the required capital because the underestimation of the required 
capital and risk by the banks is possible to maximize the return on equity.  
Moreover, Cannata and Quagliariello (2009) suggest that the internal 
models should be controlled by the supervisory authorities and the 
methodologies should be developed. For instance banks’ rating systems 
which only focus on the quantitative data should also include the qualitative 
information on borrowers. Also, the global financial crisis demonstrated the 
failure of other forecasting methodologies, not only the internal ratings 
based approach of Basel II. 
5.2.1.6 Regulatory Arbitrage  
 
Basel II caused to the regulatory arbitrage or not? Basel II is 
criticized that it caused to the regulatory arbitrage by giving some incentives 
to the banks to deconsolidate very risky exposures from their balance-sheets 
while converting some on-balance sheet items into off-balance sheet items, 
banks may decrease their capital reserves. Moreover Ökmen (2005) inserts 
that in the Basel accords, the on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
concepts are confused because on-balance-sheet assets and off-balance-
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sheet liabilities and non-cash loans are evaluated in the same category and 
subjected to the same procedure in terms of capital requirements. Also, 
intermediaries did not give adequate importance to the liquidity and 
concentration risks. Also, Ökmen (2005) claims that by Basel accords, 
banks are given the right to move their assets to the low risk group for 
collecting more resources or to shift their assets to the zero risk groups for 
collecting infinite resources and the most important deficiency of Basel 
accords is to give opportunity of concealing capital insufficiencies by the 
capital arbitrage. Nevertheless, according to Cannata and Quagliariello 
(2009), it is fair to say that the guilty of the regulatory arbitrage is the Basel 
I Accord. 
To conclude, in spite of the accusations about Basel II, Cannata and 
Quagliariello support the idea that Basel II Accord could not be effective in 
the sub-prime financial crisis because at that time, Basel II regulations were 
not valid in the United States and also the use of the regulations was very 
limited in Europe.  
5.3 Post Financial Crisis Situation in the World 
 
The effects of global financial crisis are still continuing and the 
policies implemented by the developed countries give direction to the global 
economy. While the recent progresses of U.S.A economy affect positively 
the global economy, the financial problems and the political uncertainties of 
some EU countries makes harder to overcome the results of the global crisis. 
In developed countries, growth and unemployment rates is in a negative 
condition compared to the pre-crisis period. Moreover, because of the 
nested structure of the market, economic deterioration risk in the developing 
countries which have an economic relationship with EU countries increased. 
Low credit supply and domestic demand in developed countries, made the 
recovering process of the growing rates slower. Especially in the EU 
countries, increased budget deficits during the crisis became a public debt 
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problem and this made harder to carry out fiscal policies to promote growth 
in the related countries. Thus, the reducing growth rates of the developed 
countries are still continuing and international institutions updated their 
2012-2013 growing forecasts negatively. 
Chart 5.1 Annual Growth Rates of Chosen Countries (%) 
 
Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası, May 2012, Finansal İstikrar Raporu, p. 1 
 
Depending on the increased risks of EU countries, the credit risk in 
their banking sector also increased and the profitability indicators 
deteriorated. Thus, according to the results of the banks’ lending trends 
survey made by AMD, EU banks are reluctant to give loans and they 
tightened the requirements for giving loans. This situation affects the credit 
growing negatively in EU countries and impedes the economic recovering 
process. Moreover, CBRT (2012) states that it may negatively affect the 
companies who have a credit relationship with these banks.   
The deterioration of the credit quality of EU banks, difficulties related 
to the financing sources and the need for additional capital of the banks 
were created pressure on these banks for making smaller or re-shaping their 
balance sheets. CBRT (2012) claims that EU banks’ rapid decrease of their 
assets may cause to negative consequences globally. In addition, the  
balance sheet reducing may affect asset prices and asset quality negatively 
109 
 
and it may cause to the deterioration of the fiscal activities by narrowing the 
real sectors credit channels. On the other hand, it is thought that this trend 
will decrease the debts of the non-banking sector in the mid-term and will 
also contribute to the financial stability. 
Consequently, the post-crisis measures provided by the authorities of 
the developed countries provide some relief but the political uncertainties 
and the lack of permanent structural solutions affect the global economic 
performance negatively.   
5.3.1 Balance Sheet Reduction Operations of International 
Banks and its Effects on Developing Countries 
 
Developed countries whose leverage ratios were reached very high 
levels before the global financial crisis, were caught to the economic crisis 
with a fragile balance sheet structure in which capital quality and ratios are 
low. In the post-crisis period, the banking system becomes subject to a great 
pressure for reducing the leverage rates and risk exposures by the global 
regulations about Basel III, resolution regimes and OTC derivative markets 
done by the institutions that have a systemic global importance. In the 
current situation, USA centered banks succeed to reduce their leverage 
ratios, however EU countries’ banking sector is still behind the desired point 
because of the high debt level of European countries as well as their need of 
non-deposit borrowing. If the leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of assets 
to capital, there is two ways to reduce leverage rate. The first method is to 
increase the capital and the second method is to decrease assets. Although 
the first method –increasing the capital – is the more preferred and less 
harmful method for the developed countries, there are some negative 
opinions that the rise of the capital by banks is difficult in the current 
situation. In the second situation – reducing assets – it is predicted that the 
European banks will reduce the funds and credits provided to the developing 
countries in order to decrease their assets. This issue might affect the 
110 
 
resources transferred to the real economy and the growing rates.  According 
to the Global Financial Stability Report of IMF (2012), the shrinkage of the 
EU banks’ balance sheet is equal to 7% of their total assets and it means that 
the shrinkage will be more than 2 trillion Euros. On the other hand, it is 
predicted that the impact of this shrinkage on developing countries may 
change but the biggest impact will be experienced in the developing EU 
countries. According to this, EU members’ developing countries will be 
faced with 4% decrease in their private loans. IMF predicts that this rate 
may 3% in developing countries who are not in the European Union such as 
Russia and Turkey. In addition, according to the IMF, the rates of Latin 
America and Asia will be less than 3%. On the other hand, the level of this 
effect will change due to the different fragile structures, volatile capital 
flows and the policies implemented by the countries.  In this context, CBRT 
(2012) suggests that countries should have flexible economy policies for 
adapting to the changing conditions. Moreover, countries should create 
alternative funds to deepen their domestic market to be less affected from 
the foreign based balance-sheet shrinking policies and external shocks. 
5.4 Credit Rating Agencies 
 
 Reaching the information in the capital market causes to loss of time 
for the market participants and loads high costs. As a result of this, correct, 
trustable and understandable analysis is needed by the market actors. 
Ratings affect the decisions of the investors. At the same time, the business 
activities of domestic investors, getting loans from other countries, bond 
tradings and projects which needs overseas credits are all affected from the 
ratings which are given by the credit rating agencies. Making investments to 
the countries which are at the level of investment is a rule in Europe and 
USA so the suppliers and demanders of funds are dependent to these ratings. 
Because of this reason, the entrance of the funds are blocked in the countries 
who are not among the countries rated at the level of investment such as 
Turkey. When these countries are rated at the level of investment, there will 
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be low cost source flow to these countries. Ratings affect both the cost of 
borrowing and the enterance of the foreign funds to the country.  
 Rating agencies generate their revenues by issuing bonds more than 
rating activities that they are making. This issue causes to some critisizms 
about the rating agencies that they serve in the interest of international 
capital. Credit rating agencies use some qualitative and quantitative criterias 
while determining international institutions’ ratings. These criterias include 
economical evaluations such as countries’ economical flexibility, growth 
potential and economical stability, debt ratios and capacity to pay and 
political evalutions such as countries’ political stability, foreign policy 
developments, risks in the political agenda and the independency degree of 
the countries’ Central banks.  The information shared with third parties 
about the rated company is limited to publicly available information. This 
issue causes to the critisicizms about the transparancy of the rating agencies. 
Sovereign credit rating refers to the level of investment of a country. 
After taking low ratings in 90’s, Turkey could not use low cost loans in the 
international market so Turkey applied to internal debts and this situation 
affected the economy negatively. While comparing some countries’ growth 
rates,  existing stock of external debt and inflation data, it is observed that 
the ratings have not a certain standard. The countries such as Ireland, Spain 
and Iceland whose public debts are higher than Turkey  and growth rates are 
low are given the same rating  with Turkey. Although several countries’ 
economic indicators are terrible, the ratings are high.  For example, the 
rating of Iceland is higher than Turkey even Iceland’s public debt to GDP 
ratio was 98.8% in 2011 and its growth rate was 3.1% while in Turkey, the 
public debt to GDP ratio was 39.4% and the growth rate was 8.5%. The 
rating agencies who assert that Turkey has a high current account deficit 
contradict with themselves by giving higher rating to Iceland whose current 
account deficit is 8%. This inconsistency among the credit rating agencies 
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shows that analysts of these agencies have subjective decisions and the 
credibility of the rating agencies decrease. 
5.4.1 Credit Default Swaps and Credit Ratings 
 
 Critisisms about the credit rating agencies which were seen as the 
reason of global financial cirisis has been renewed after the debt crisis in the 
Euro zone.  There is a perception that credit rating agencies systematically 
affect the crisis by making late and sudden changes in the countries’ ratings.  
After these negative impressions about the credit rating agencies, the 
importance of CDS which give actual credit ratings increased. CDS is a 
credit derivative instrument which protects the creditor against the non-
payment risk of the loan.  
  Chart 5.2 Annual CDS Spreads (2012) 
Karagöl, T. E. & İstiklal Mıhçıokur Ü. 2012, Kredi Derecelendirme Kuruluşları: Alternatif Arayışlar,p.22 
 On the other hand, CDS premium is the fee given to undertake the 
credit risk. This ratio shows the risk premium which should be paid for the 
country risk. The high risk premium means the credibility of country is low. 
There is a high difference between the ratings given by the credit rating 
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agencies and CDS premiums.  While economic, financial and political 
stability of Turkey is accepted by the markets, this credibility is not 
converted into high ratings by the credit rating agencies. In the countries in 
which the financial conditions  improved, CDS premiums decreases but the 
ratings are not increased by the credit rating agencies. For example, 
countries such as Ireland, Slovenia, Belgium whose ratings are A and 
BBB+, have more risk premium than Turkey whose credit rating is in the 
non-investible degree.  
 While evaluating the value of CDS’s in the long term, there are 
important differences between pre and post crisis period in the countries 
which are affected from the European debt crisis. In Chart 5.3, the CDS 
spreads of Turkey, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Hungary were quite low before 
the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis period in 2008, the 
spreads reach to very high levels. After the crisis, in 2009, the CDS spreads 
of Turkey returned to the level of pre crisis but other countries’ CDS 
spreads stayed at high levels. 
 
Chart 5.3 CDS Spreads Trend of Chosen Countries 
  
Karagöl, T. E. & İstiklal Mıhçıokur Ü. 2012, Kredi Derecelendirme Kuruluşları: Alternatif Arayışlar, p.23. 
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 Credit ratings are not obligatory in Turkey so the credit rating culture 
has not been formed yet. From this perspective, Basel accords will 
contribute to the creation of this culture. Turkey should make some 
regulations for the national rating agencies to provide ratings compatible 
with the international standards.  
 The latest version of Basel III Accord does not include all of the 
decisions taken in G-20 summit to prevent the difficulties related to the 
compliance with regulations.  The decisions and applications of G-20 
summit are concrete examples of the works aiming to solve the problems 
about the credit rating agencies. In these summits, it is emphasized that the 
audit, transparancy and service quality of the credit rating agencies should 
be increased. On the other hand, it is emphasized that the investors and 
developing countries should act independently from the ratings given by the 
credit rating agencies.  
5.5 Predictions Related to Basel III Accord  
 
Following the global financial crisis, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision revealed Basel III regulations to improve Basel II Accord and 
strengthen banking sector’s risk management, supervisory structure and 
financial regulations. As mentioned before, Basel III Accord contains some 
new implementation policies such as increasing quantitatively the minimum 
capital, making some changes in the quality of the capital, creation of a new 
non risk-based minimum capital requirement, the ability of increasing or 
decreasing the capital requirement according to the economic cycle and 
some regulations about liquidity ratios.  
In Table 5.2, the differences between Basel II and Basel III capital 
adequacy ratios can be seen. The common equity ratio will be raised 
gradually to 7%, Tier 1 capital to 8,5% and the total regulatory capital to 
10,5%. 
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Table 5.2 Strengthened Capital Framework: Basel II to Basel III 
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While Basel III has not implemented yet, there are some predictions 
about it. Blundell - Wignall and Atkinson (2010) criticize Basel III Accord 
because it does not consist of a regulatory framework for the shadow 
banking.  There should be a single regulator for the whole financial sector. 
Banks are highly regulated by the bank regulators but insurance companies 
or hedge funds are lightly regulated. They claim that banks will continue to 
transform their risk buckets to derivatives to decrease their capital reserves. 
For instance, banks will lead the risk buckets to the insurance sector because 
the insurance sector is not well regulated. Also, Fabiani (2010) asserts that 
despite the shadow banking was a big problem of the global financial crisis, 
there is not a regulation in Basel III for the non-banking financial 
institutions like insurance companies and investment banks. While there is 
not a regulation about this issue, shadow banking remains as an advantage 
for risk taking. Basel III which aims to prevent future crisis did not take into 
consideration the contagion risk because a crisis in the non-banking 
financial sector may affect the whole banking system. Moreover, according 
to Blundell - Wignall and Atkinson (2010) the leverage ratio should be a 
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main capital control tool and it should not be used as a backstop. This means 
that BIS should determine the leverage ratio at a level which banks could 
not minimize their capital by the capital arbitrage. Basel III Accord does not 
include a regulation like this. 
KPMG (2011) claims that the competition between banks will 
decrease due to Basel III because it will be difficult for weaker banks to 
provide the required capital. For instance, banks which have a high net 
stable funding ratio will determine the assets’ market price so weaker banks 
could not compete with them. Also, the leverage ratio will decrease lending 
and the liquidity coverage ratio will affect negatively the profitability 
because banks will keep more liquid and low-yielding assets to fulfill the 
liquidity coverage ratio. They assert that the capacity of banking activity 
may decrease because of the Basel III suggested capital and liquidity 
requirements. Moreover if countries apply Basel III regulations according to 
their own jurisdictions as they did in Basel I and Basel II, the international 
regulatory arbitrage will continue to damage the global financial stability. 
Fabiani (2010) asserts that there are doubts in the market such as the 
credit access will be difficult for the SMEs and start-up businesses after the 
implementation of Basel III because smaller banks will tighten their credit 
conditions. Also, he said that the effect of Basel III on economic growth in 
the long-run is not obvious. There are two studies which are announced by 
the Basel Committee and Institute of International Finance. According to the 
study of the Basel Committee, with the effects of capital and liquidity 
requirements, the growth rate will be 0,04% above the expected trend in the 
first four and a half years and the rate will be 0,02% more than the expected 
trend in the following years. When this time period decreases into two 
years, the decline related to the GDP increases from 0,19% to 0,22%. In 
contrast, when the implementation period increases to six years, the GDP 
decline decreases. On the other hand, Institute of International Finance 
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study demonstrates that the increase on the capital requirements will reduce 
the real GDP growth annually 0.6% in the first four and a half years. 
On the other hand, Coşkun et al. (2012) claim that Basel III 
regulations will bring some costs too. According to the predictions, the 
implementation of Basel III will cause an increase in the banks’ credit 
spreads as a result of the high capital adequacy ratios. In order to meet this 
requirement, financial institutions should increase their credit spreads 
approximately 15 basis points for the common equity ratio which is 4,5% 
and  Tier 1 capital ratio which is 8% till the end of 2015. Moreover, it is 
assumed that because of the 7% common equity ratio and 8,5% Tier 1 
capital ratio which will be implemented in 2019, the credit spreads will  
increase 50 basis points. As Matai (2010) points out in the whole European 
banking system, the need is 1,5 trillion USD in order to provide the capital 
and liquidity requirements of Basel III. In the USA banking system, the 
issue is not different from Europe.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
There is no doubt that as a result of the technological improvements, 
globalization became the most important determining component and the 
field which is the most affected by the globalization is the financial market. 
The globalization process contributed to the growth by combining national 
and international markets. Moreover, it rapidly increased the interaction 
between the real sector and financial market and by this way economic 
structure became more sensitive to the risks.  
Risk management is one of the most important issue of the banking 
sector because it is the most deep-rooted and widespread agent of the 
financial market. Banking sector may provide significant contributions to 
the economic development by the effective risk management but in the 
opposite case it may cause costly crisis which will spread all over the world. 
From this perspective,  a common global language about risk management 
has a vital importance for the whole financial market.   As a result of the 
insufficiencies of the traditional studies for preventing risk, Basel 
Committee announced Basel I Accord in 1988, Basel II Accord in 2004, 
Basel 2.5 Accord in 2009 and finally Basel III Accord in 2010.  Each accord 
is created in order to resolve the deficiencies of the previous one. 
Basel I Accord has various positive features: it is easy to apply, 
creates a fair competition environment and it gives place to the definition of 
capital adequacy for the first time. Despite these positive features,  Basel I 
Accord left its place to Basel II Accord because Basel I consists of only five 
different risk weights and shows the assets which have different risks in the 
same risk group. Moreover, Basel I does not include operational risks and  it 
does not differentiate the borrowers while calculating capital requirement 
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and the methods used by Basel I Accord in the measurement of credit and 
market risks could not measure banking risks in a realistic way. 
Basel II Accord meets important needs of the banking sector and 
financial market by increasing transparancy with market discipline based on 
the public information and minimizing asymetric information while 
describing the banking risks in detail, offering flexible and comprehensive 
methods to measure them,  including operational risk capital requirements 
and attaching great importance to the supervision of banks. However, after 
the crisis occured in 2008, it became a necessity to change the capital 
quality, increase the capital quantity, create capital buffers, apply a leverage 
ratio and regulate the calculations about minimum liquidity ratio, trading 
accounts and counterparty credit risk. Therefore, these needs caused to the 
creation of Basel 2.5 and then Basel III Accord. 
In this study, it can be seen that there are both positive and negative 
predictions about Basel III, although it was not implemented yet.  For 
instance, it is predicted that the uncertainties of banking sector will be 
eliminated and the systematic risk will be reduced by Basel III regulations. 
On the other hand it is criticized that small banks will be faced with some 
difficulties on fulfilling the obligations on capital and liquidity so 
competition will reduce. Moreover, there are criticisms like bank funds will 
move towards government debt instruments that have high ratings, the 
companies with lower rating will have difficulties in obtaining funds and 
Basel III does not contain regulations for the shadow banking system which 
was one of the main reasons of the financial crisis. 
From the perspective of Turkey, after the acceptance of Basel I 
Accord in 1988, a gradual transition process was followed for Basel II and 
Turkey started to implement Basel II Accord in July 2012. The effective 
implementation of this accord is important for its contributions to the 
financial stability but it is also important for the harmonization efforts to the 
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EU.  Moreover, the flexibilities provided in the accord should be 
implemented in the most appropriate way by the countries because if the 
provided flexibilities are not chosen according to the conditions of the 
country, the regulations may impose a burden which is disproportional with 
the risks or they may allow to the concealing of risks’ true level. In Turkey, 
the final shape of the accord was given after the adaptation of these 
flexibilities. Although the global financial crisis, Turkish banking sector is 
protected its strength structure with the precautions taken.  While comparing 
with other countries, it is possible to say that the capital adequacy ratio and 
equity to total assets ratio of Turkish banking sector is among the countries 
that have highest ratios. For these reasons, it is predicted that Turkey will 
not be faced with important problems about the compliance process of Basel 
III Accord. 
There are some debates about the negative effects of Basel II in  
2008 financial crisis. Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, Basel II 
Accord could not be one of the reasons of the crisis because when the crisis 
arises, Basel II was not enforced in USA and had a limited field of 
application in EU. However the deficiencies of Basel I Accord may be one 
of the reasons of the crisis because it has been applied in almost every 
country when the crisis arises. To conclude, although there are some 
negative views about Basel accords, it is not possible to ignore its 
contributions to the sector. Moreover, non-implementation of the accord 
will be more costly than implementation of it. 
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